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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION 
Due to the relative lack of success of the fight against corruption on a national level in many 
countries, there is widespread recognition that international cooperation could be an important 
tool in the fight against corruption.
1
 International legal instruments aiming to combat 
corruption have increased significantly both on the regional and global level in the last 20 
years.
2
 In spite of the notable quantitative increase of legal instruments, the existing 
international legal framework against corruption has considerable flaws and has largely failed 
to end impunity especially for corruption by high-level State officials. A new instrument in the 
fight against this type of corruption could be to bestow jurisdiction for the crime of corruption 
upon the ICC. 
1.1.   Research questions 
• Is the existing international legal framework adequate for fighting grand corruption?  
• Should the ICC have de lege ferenda jurisdiction ratione materiae over the crime of  
  corruption?  
1.2.   Literature review 
As regards the first research question, in the early days of this research, there was only one 
report
3
 published by an NGO called U4 which contained a political economic analysis of the 
United Nations Convention against Corruption (UNCAC). Later, an article on UNCAC‟s 
deterrent effect in regards to grand corruption was published by Daniel and Maiton, which 
focused on case studies.
4
 A thorough legal analysis however has not been completed, and 
appears to be warranted. 
                                                 
1
 Preamble (4) UNCAC; Preamble (2) Council of Europe Civil Law Convention on Corruption. 
2
 Bacio Terracino J The International Legal Framework against Corruption (2012) 47 et seq. 
3
 U4 „Can UNCAC address grand corruption? A political economy analysis of the UN Convention against 
Corruption and its implementation in three countries‟ (2011).  
4
 Daniel T & Maiton J „Is the UNCAC an effective deterrent to grand corruption?‟ in Horder J & Allridge P 
(eds) Modern Bribery Law – Comparative Perspectives (2013) 294 et seq. 
 
 
 
 
2 
As far as the second research question is concerned, a few authors have explored whether 
corruption is or should be considered a crime under international law.
5
 Kofele-Kale was the 
first to give scholarly attention to corruption from the perspective of international criminal 
law.
6
 Boersma has more recently examined whether it is possible to conceptualise certain 
forms of corruption as a crime under international law.
7
 Further, a piece by Starr deals with 
international criminal prosecutions of corruption as one potential strategy for overcoming the 
current „crisis focus‟ of international criminal law. However, the paper relies exclusively on 
the prosecution of corruption as a crime against humanity. 
This research paper will examine whether the ICC should de lege ferenda be accorded 
jurisdiction in respect of the crime of corruption. Through this approach, the paper will 
contribute to the existing literature on corruption that argues in favour of an elevation of 
corruption to a crime under international law and, in addition, will proffer a specialised 
mechanism for addressing the problem. 
1.3.   Chapter outline 
The paper will begin with an elaboration of the understanding and suitable limitations of the 
notion of corruption for the purpose of the study (Chapter 2). Thereafter, Chapter 3 analyses 
to what extent existing international anti-corruption law is able to adequately address and 
fight grand corruption. This analysis is indicated, since a thorough discussion on whether the 
ICC should deal with the crime of corruption necessarily presupposes knowledge of current 
shortcomings, flaws and challenges. The subsequent chapter is dedicated to exploring the 
question of whether the ICC can, under the current Rome Statute, exercise jurisdiction over 
some forms of corruption. Should this be the case, the question of an expansion of the ICC‟s 
                                                 
5
 Bantekas I „Corruption as an International Crime and a Crime against Humanity: An Outline of Supplementary 
Criminal Justice Policies‟ (2006) 4 Journal of International Criminal Justice 466 et seq.; Starr S „Extraordinary 
Crimes at Ordinary Times: International Justice Beyond Crisis Situations‟ (2007) 101 Northwestern University 
Law Review 1257 et seq. 
6
 Kofele-Kale N „Patrimonicide: The International Economic Crime of Indigenious Spoliation‟ (1995) 28 
Vanderbilt Journal of Transnational Law 45 et seq. 
7
 Boersma M Corruption: A Violation of Human Rights and a Crime Under International Law? (2012). 
 
 
 
 
3 
jurisdiction could not even arise. Alternatively, the question would be whether the ICC should 
have express jurisdiction over the crime of corruption or over additional forms of corruption. 
Subsequently, in Chapter 5, the paper discusses whether the ICC, firstly, can and, secondly, 
should de lege ferenda have jurisdiction over the crime of corruption. It then outlines in 
Chapter 6 rough guidelines for potential elements of the crime of corruption within the 
jurisdiction of the ICC. Chapter 7 concludes by summarising the substantial findings and 
providing an outlook on the political feasibility of the inclusion of the crime of corruption 
within the Rome Statute. 
  
 
 
 
 
4 
CHAPTER 2: NOTION OF CORRUPTION  
This chapter specifies the meaning of the notion of corruption within the research paper.  
There is no single, uniformly accepted definition of corruption. The varied approaches by 
differing disciplines
8
 and the complexity of the phenomenon of corruption have led to a 
myriad of definitions. Even legal instruments, i.e. national law
9
 as well as international 
conventions
10
, prevalently limit themselves to criminalise certain corrupt behaviours without 
defining the notion of corruption itself. The research paper does not aim at contributing to the 
search for the „true definition of corruption‟, which as Moodie has written, „is like the pursuit 
of the Holy Grail, endless, exhausting and ultimately futile… .‟11 However, there is a need for 
a working definition for the purpose of the paper. This need not be sufficiently precise to 
comply with the requirements of the principle of legal certainty, but may serve to clarify the 
scope of the phenomenon dealt with within the paper. The starting point shall be the far-
reaching definition used by Transparency International – the most influential and prominent 
global NGO aimed at combating corruption: „the abuse of entrusted power for private gain‟.12 
This definition covers abuse of power in both the public as well as the private sector. With 
such a broad definition, the mere claim for jurisdiction of the ICC over the crime of 
corruption may admittedly seem to be very progressive and arguably audacious. Against this 
background, one could suggest that a restrictive approach to the definition of corruption 
appears warranted. Hence, for the purpose of this study, the term „corruption‟ is to be limited 
                                                 
8
 For instance, lawyers, criminologists, economists, political and social scientists and anthropologists deal with 
corruption. Given their respectively different methodology and different starting points, they beget different 
definitions. 
9
See, e.g., § 331 et seq. German Criminal Code. 
10
 This is particularly true for UNCAC. Only Article 1(2) SADC Protocol Against Corruption provides for an 
extensive definition. 
11
 Moodie GC „On Political Scandals and Corruption‟(1980) 15 Government and Opposition 209 citing Williams 
RJ „The Problems of Corruption: A Conceptual and Comparative Analysis‟ (paper delivered to a Public 
Administration Committee Conference in York, 1976) 2. This quote is borrowed from Bacio Terracino (2012) 8. 
12
 See http://www.transparency.org/whatwedo (accessed 26 October 2013). 
 
 
 
 
5 
in two respects: the paper will only deal with corruption committed by public officials and is 
further restricted to the typology of grand as opposed to petty corruption. 
2.1   Limitation to the public sector 
The working definition of corruption for the purposes of this study is limited to corruption 
committed by public officials. By implication, the research paper will not deal with corrupt 
practices occurring solely within the private sector and not address, in the case of bribery, the 
private briber. The reasons for this limitation are as follows: First, the limitation to the public 
sector reflects the more traditional approach to corruption
13
, whereas the concept of 
corruption in the private sector is a rather recent one which remains controversial. Indeed, a 
vast number of scholars
14
 and the World Bank
15
 apprehend corruption still today as limited to 
the public sector. Likewise, existing international legal instruments aimed at combating 
corruption focus predominantly on public sector corruption.
16
 Though the pivotal role played 
by private actors in the commission of corruption should not be disregarded, more often than 
not private companies involved in such cases originate from jurisdictions with well-
functioning criminal justice systems that can deal appropriately with such cases. Therefore the 
focus on the demand or taking-side
17
 of corruption, as far as two-sided forms of corruption 
are concerned, is appropriate. 
                                                 
13
 Ouzounov NA „Facing the Challenge: Corruption, State Capture and the Role of Multinational Business‟ 
(2004) 37 Journal of Marshall Law Review 1186. This approach can be traced back as far as 1931, Babu „The 
United Nations Convention Against Corruption: A Critical Overview‟ available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=891898 (accessed 26 October 2013). 
14
 See, e.g., Jain AK „Corruption: A Review‟ (2001) 15 Journal of Economic Surveys 73; Amundsen I Political 
Corruption: An Introduction to the Issues (1999) 2 et seq. available at 
http://www.cmi.no/publications/1999/wp/wp1999-7.pdf (accessed 26 October 2013). 
15
 See http://www1.worldbank.org/publicsector/anticorrupt/corruptn/cor02.htm (accessed 26 September 2013). 
16 
Bacio Terracino (2012) 22 et seq. In particular, the hortatory nature of the provisions on corruption in the 
private sector in Articles 21 and 22 UNCAC indicate that the broad concept of corruption including the private 
sector is not generally accepted. 
17
 The supply side concerns the offering of a bribe, whereas the demand side refers to its acceptance or request; 
Article 15(a), (b) UNCAC. 
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2.2   Limitation to grand corruption 
One of the most famous typologies of corruption analysed in anti-corruption research is that 
of grand
18
 and petty corruption, although no international or national legal instruments 
provides expressly for this distinction. Thus, there is no legal definition for the term „grand 
corruption‟, with the effect that the concept and its prerequisites remain controversial.19  
2.2.1  Qualitative element: powerful high-level authority  
Originally,
20
 the level of authority where corruption takes place has exclusively determined 
the distinction between grand and petty corruption. Whilst grand corruption takes place at the 
policy formulation end of politics, thus at the highest levels of political authority, petty 
corruption, also labelled as bureaucratic or administrative corruption, occurs in the public 
administration, at the implementation end of politics. For instance, payments to mid- and low-
level government officials, such as police or immigration officers, demanding bribes 
constitute petty corruption. Beyond controversy, high-level authorities encompass prominent 
figures such as heads of States, heads of governments and ministers. However, the precise 
scope of high-level authority remains subject to debate.
21
  
2.2.2  Quantitative element: large-scale corruption 
Increasingly, authors focus also on quantitative aspects to draw a line between grand and 
petty corruption.
22
 Typically, grand corruption is committed on a large scale and involves 
                                                 
18 
The term „grand corruption‟ was first used by Moody-Stuart in The Good Business Guide to Bribery (TI 1994). 
He defined it as „the misuse of public power by heads of State, ministers, and top officials for private pecuniary 
profit.‟; Jayawickrama N „Corruption - A Violation of Human Rights?‟ available at 
http://resources.transparency.bg/download.html?id=219 (accessed 26 October 2013). 
19
 On the differentiation between grand and petty corruption, see Mashali B „Analyzing the relationship between 
perceived grand corruption and petty corruption in developing countries: case study of Iran‟ (2012) 78 
International Review of Administrative Sciences 777 et seq. 
20 
Moody-Stuart (note 18) based his concept merely on the hierarchy of the perpetrator who commits corruption. 
21
 It is, for instance, unclear whether corrupt acts by heads of governments on a provincial or local level can 
constitute grand corruption. Furthermore, it is unsettled whether friends and families of public officials should be 
included and if so, how this group can be precisely defined. 
22
 Society of Advanced Legal Studies Anti-Corruption Working Group Banking on Corruption: The Legal 
Responsibilities of those who handle The Proceeds of Corruption (2000) 11 available at http://sas-
space.sas.ac.uk/4297/1/SALS_Banking_on_Corruption.pdf (accessed 26 October 2013); Palmer R „Combating 
Grand Corruption in Africa: Should it be an international crime?‟ available at 
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large values.
23
 For the purpose of this paper, the term grand corruption indeed necessitates 
such large-scale dimension and the involvement of large values.
24
 Quantitatively negligible 
acts of corruption, even if committed by high-level officials, are beyond the ambit of this 
paper. However, the precise quantitative border between petty and grand corruption is 
extremely difficult to draw.
25
 To name a specific amount of money would appear arbitrary; 
the circumstances of the individual case, such as local purchasing power, may ultimately be 
decisive in determine whether a certain value is sufficient to justify the categorisation of the 
act as grand corruption.  
2.2.3  Distinguishing grand corruption from kleptocracy 
Closely related to grand corruption, but still significantly different, is the concept of 
kleptocracy. Etymologically, this neologism is composed of the Greek terms „klepto‟, i.e. to 
steal, and „kratos‟, i.e. rule and means „rule by thieves or by looters‟26. Thus, the term does 
not describe a certain manifestation of corruption, but the form of a political system. Political 
leaders of kleptocracies are arguably the example par excellence of perpetrators of grand 
corruption. In alignment with the existing structures of international criminal law, this paper 
focuses on the specific individual corrupt conduct of grand corruption and does not aspire to 
argue that the leading of a certain political system is to be criminalised. Just as international 
criminal law does not criminalise the establishment or leading of a dictatorship, but rather 
specific acts which amount to genocide or crimes against humanity, the political system of 
                                                                                                                                                        
http://www.osisa.org/openspace/global/combating-grand-corruption-africa-robin-palmer (accessed 10 May 
2013).   
23
 According to Salbu SR „A Delicate Balance: Legislation, Institutional Change, and Transnational Bribery‟ 
(2000) 33 Cornell International Law Journal 663, the dimension of size is the most obvious difference. 
24
 For a concurring view, see Iqbinedion SA „A Critical Appraisal of the Mechanism for Prosecuting Grand 
Corruption Offenders Under the United Nations Convention Against Corruption‟ (2009) 6 Manchester Journal 
of International Economic Law 58 and Graham T „Legal and Other Issues Raised by Grand Corruption‟ (2000) 7 
Journal of Financial Crime 324. Some authors, however, emphasise that the level of authority where corruption 
takes place remains the only pivotal criterion, see, e.g., Boersma (2012) 29.  
25
 Indeed, the existing literature has been unable to draw a sharp line between petty and grand corruption. Only 
Salbu (2000) proposes a fix line of US$ 1,000. However, this appears arbitrary, as the author himself recognises. 
26 
Boersma (2012) 29. 
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kleptocracy cannot convincingly be subject to a study on individual international criminal 
accountability for corruption.
27
  
2.2.4  Justification for this limitation 
The limitation on grand corruption can be justified for the following two reasons. 
2.2.4.1  More severe consequences of grand corruption 
First, cases of petty corruption are typically less pernicious than acts amounting to grand 
corruption. The greater the magnitude of the corrupt act, the greater are its consequences. The 
higher severity of ramifications of instances of grand corruption warrants the exclusion of the 
category of petty corruption from the ambit of the paper. At the same time, the severity of the 
damage which can be caused by (systemic) petty corruption shall not be disregarded. The 
focus of the paper on grand corruption must not be misunderstood as dismissal of the 
importance of petty corruption. A case study in Iran has shown that the higher the perceived 
grand corruption is, the higher the level of petty corruption.
28
 Indeed, a convincing argument 
can be made that corruption at the highest level has a contagious impact on lower level 
bureaucrats.
29
 The occurrence of grand corruption can cause a political culture which tolerates 
corruption and „invites‟ low-level bureaucrats to commit corrupt acts as well. By the same 
token, if grand corruption is fought effectively, this would most likely have positive effects for 
the fight against corruption on the lower levels as well.
30
 Thus, the endeavour to hold the 
high-level perpetrators of grand corruption, the infamous „big fish‟, accountable, most likely 
leads to an increase of credibility of anti-corruption efforts aimed at combating petty 
corruption.  
                                                 
27
 But see Eboe-Osuji C „Kleptocracy: A Desired Subject of International Criminal Law That Is in Dire Need of 
Prosecution by Universal Jurisdiction‟ in Ankumah EA & Kwakwa EK (ed) African Perspectives on 
International Criminal Justice (2005) 121 et seq. Admittedly, the crime of apartheid refers to a specific political 
regime; however, the Rome Statute defines apartheid in Article 7(2)(h) as inhumane acts committed in the 
context of and with the intention with the intention of maintaining that regime. 
28
 Mashali (2012) 784 et seq.  
29
 Amundsen (1999) 5. 
30
 Ouzounov (2004) 1189 with further references. 
 
 
 
 
9 
2.2.4.2  Higher Degree of Universality of Condemnation of Grand Corruption  
Secondly, the focus on grand corruption makes it more likely that the reasoning of this paper 
does not expose itself to the potential criticism of ignorance towards different cultures
31
 
which may draw the line between innocuous and perfectly legal customs and criminal petty 
corruption in slightly different ways. Whilst gift-giving or acts of hospitality may or may not 
constitute a criminal act of corruption in different national jurisdictions, in cases of grand 
corruption, local social particularities are unlikely to lead to differing moral or legal 
assessments. Grand corruption cases encompass corrupt behaviours, the unlawful and 
criminal character of which is generally accepted, irrespective of the cultural context of the 
conduct in question. Thus, cases of grand corruption are unlikely to be dismissed as related to 
local custom or differing social norms. The potential claim for the jurisdiction of the ICC 
necessitates imperatively such a consensus across various countries and cultures. 
2.3   Provisional result 
Thus, for the purpose of this research paper, corruption is understood in a restrictive way: the 
large-scale abuse of public power for private gain committed by high-level public authorities 
or, more succinctly, grand corruption in the public sector. 
  
                                                 
31
 On the controversial issue whether the definition of corruption should indeed take into consideration certain 
cultural particularities or not see Rothstein B & Torsello D Is Corruption understood differently in different 
Cultures? (2013) available at http://www.qog.pol.gu.se/digitalAssets/1443/ 
1443545_2013_5_rothstein_torsello.pdf (accessed 26 October 2013).  
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CHAPTER 3: THE EXISTING INTERNATIONAL LEGAL 
FRAMEWORK FOR GRAND CORRUPTION  
This chapter analyses to what extent the presently existing international anti-corruption law is 
able to adequately address and fight grand corruption. First, it gives a short overview of the 
development of international anti-corruption framework. Thereafter, it addresses the most 
striking legal shortcomings and deficiencies as to criminalisation, jurisdiction, immunities, 
asset recovery and enforcement and monitoring of international obligations which may 
potentially be remedied by an inclusion of the crime of grand corruption into the Rome 
Statute. Lastly, the chapter assesses the factual effectiveness of existing law in combating 
grand corruption. 
3.1   Overview 
For most of the 20
th
 century, the phenomenon of corruption and the fight against it had been 
understood as a merely domestic issue reserved to national sovereignty.
32
 Only the last two 
decades, especially the end of the 1990s, have witnessed a rapid and impressive development 
of a multitude of international anti-corruption instruments
33
 and the emergence of an 
international anti-corruption consensus that ultimately culminated in the adoption of UNCAC 
in 2003.
34
 The following analysis focuses primarily on UNCAC, given its special significance 
in the international fight against corruption as the only legally binding universal anti-
corruption instrument with almost global validity as well as the most far-reaching 
                                                 
32
 Low LA The United Nations Convention Against Corruption: The Globalization of Anticorruption Standards 
(2006) 1 available at http://www.steptoe.com/assets/attachments/2599.pdf (accessed 26 October 2013). The only 
remarkable exception was the US legislation called Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA) of 1977 which aimed 
specifically at curbing bribery of foreign public officials by US companies and thus had an international 
dimension.  
33
 For a tabular overview, see Carr I „Corruption, legal solutions and limits of law‟ (2007) 3 International Law in 
Context 247 et seq. 
34
 Kubiciel M „Core Criminal Law Provisions in the United Nations Convention Against Corruption‟ (2009) 9 
International Criminal Law Review 139 et seq.  
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instrument.
35
 It is worth noting here that UNCAC does not expressly target grand corruption 
and treats grand corruption no differently from petty corruption.
36
 
3.2   Criminalisation 
UNCAC– unlike the OECD Convention37 – goes well beyond defining corruption as bribery, 
the most traditional manifestation of corruption, by prohibiting numerous forms of corruption, 
particularly diversion, but also trading in influence, abuse of functions, and illicit 
enrichment.
38
 Thus, UNCAC also encompasses large-scale embezzlement and theft of funds 
directly from public treasuries, which are frequent modalities of grand corruption.
39
 
Furthermore, Article 2 UNCAC explicitly encompasses all public officials, bureaucrats, 
judges, and politicians alike irrespective of their seniority, whether appointed or elected. 
Thus, UNCAC employs a broader understanding of public officials including also high-level 
officials, such as, for instance, heads of States or heads of governments. Insofar as this is the 
case, it must be said that the criminalisation provisions in Chapter III UNCAC generally 
cover potential instances of grand corruption.
 
However, substantial flaws must be highlighted: First, the criminalisation of passive bribery 
of national public officials and diversion by public officials is mandatory
40
, whereas State 
Parties are merely required to consider the criminalisation of the demand side of bribery of 
                                                 
35 
Low (2006) 3. 
36 
However, UNCAC expresses in section 3 of its preamble concern about quantitatively vast cases, namely 
„cases of corruption that involve vast quantities of assets, which may constitute a substantial proportion of the 
resources of States, and that threaten the political stability and sustainable development of those States‟ and thus 
makes a reference to the phenomenon of grand corruption. One may also refer to section 7 and 8 of the 
preamble, see Webster ME „Fifteen Minutes of Shame: The Growing Notoriety of Grand Corruption‟ (2008) 31 
Hastings International and Comparative Law Review 811.  
37 
The OECD Convention is limited to active bribery of foreign public officials (Article 1). 
38
 Article 17 et seq. UNCAC. 
39  
Kofele-Kale N „The Right to a Corruption-Free Society as an Individual and Collective Human Right: 
Elevating Official Corruption to a Crime under International Law‟ (2000) 34 The International Lawyer 157 et 
seq. In the Sani Abacha case, for instance, embezzlement of public funds through (direct) access to the Central 
Bank was a common feature, see Bacio Terracino (2012) 277. 
40
 For the sake of completeness, it may be noted that Article 23 UNCAC on money-laundering and Article 25 
UNCAC on obstruction of justice are mandatory as well.  
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foreign public officials
41
. Secondly, what all presently existing anti-corruption conventions 
have in common is that the criminalisation of certain acts of corruption still takes place on a 
national level.
42
 Hitherto, the crime of corruption is a so-called treaty crime
43
, in other words 
part of transnational criminal law
44
 and subject of so-called „suppression‟ conventions.45 
These conventions oblige States to prohibit certain conduct under national law, whereas 
crimes under international law impose criminal responsibility directly upon individuals 
without requiring the intervention of domestic law
46
. There has been no consensus thus far 
regarding the criminalisation of certain acts of corruption on the international level 
independently from domestic law; criminalisation remains, even though induced by 
international law, a domestic concern.  
3.3    Jurisdiction  
Given that grand corruption instances frequently feature a transnational element
47
, the issue of 
criminal jurisdiction is of considerable importance to effective combat against grand 
corruption. Article 42(1) UNCAC only requires mandatorily States Parties to establish so-
called territorial jurisdiction, that is to say jurisdiction over corruption offences when 
committed in its territory.
48
 Besides that, UNCAC merely encourages States Parties to 
establish jurisdiction in other constellations. For instance Article 42(4) UNCAC permits a 
                                                 
41
 In instances of transnational corruption, UNCAC sets the priority in favour of tackling the supply side through 
extra-territorial legislation. Prosecuting the demand side would – except for questionable trials in absentia – 
require the rather unlike presence of the foreign public official in question and involve legally complex issues of 
jurisdiction and immunity, see Brunelle-Quraishi „Assessing the Relevancy and Efficacy of the United Nations 
Convention against Corruption: A Comparative Analysis‟ (2011) 1 Notre Dame Journal of International and 
Comparative Law 113.  
42 
Boersma (2012) 98. 
43
 The term „treaty crime‟ is somewhat confusing, since core crimes can also be subject to a special treaty 
besides being part of customary international law, see Genocide Convention and Geneva Conventions. 
44
 Boister N „Transnational Criminal Law?‟ (2003) 14 European Journal of International Law 953 et seq. 
45
 For an opposing view, advocating that corruption is already today a crime under international law, Kofele-
Kale N The International Law of Responsibility for Economic Crimes: Holding State Officials Individually 
Liable for Acts of Fraudulent Enrichment 2 ed (2006) 255. 
46
 Werle G Principles of International Criminal Law 2 ed (2009) para 114.. 
47
 For the transnational character of grand corruption cases, see 5.3.4. 
48
 It should be noted, however, that the obligation to establish territorial jurisdiction in Article 42(1) UNCAC 
applies to the mandatory criminal offence of laundering proceeds of corruption (Article 23 UNCAC) as well. 
Thus, States Parties hosting proceeds of corruption, whether stashed away in bank accounts or invested in assets, 
such as real estate, are legally vested to prosecute the subsequent offence of money laundering. 
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custodial State to exercise jurisdiction over offences committed by a fugitive offender on its 
territory. Yet, UNCAC does not require States to establish jurisdiction over fugitive foreign 
public officials. Lastly, UNCAC does not lay the legal foundation for applying universal 
jurisdiction
49
, that is to say jurisdiction over cases which do not feature any immediate link to 
the State exercising its jurisdiction, for severe instances of grand corruption.
50
  
In conclusion, UNCAC restricts itself to require exclusive jurisdiction on victim States, 
regardless of its potentially lacking political will or non-existing factual capacity. If the 
national system fails to do justice for its own perpetrators of grand corruption, in all 
probability their conduct goes, in the current legal framework, unpunished.
51
 
3.4    Immunities 
Since grand corruption cases inherently involve high-level public officials, the usually 
associated privilege of criminal immunity has often proven to be one of the main legal 
obstacles to effectively prosecute grand corruption both in the victim State as well as in third 
States and has indeed in many instances led to impunity.
52
 Thus, a thorough analysis of the 
existing law on immunity for corruption offences is indicated.  
                                                 
49
 According to the Princeton Principles on Universal Jurisdiction, universal jurisdiction is „criminal jurisdiction 
based solely on the nature of the crime, without regard to where the crime was committed, the nationality of the 
alleged or convicted perpetrator, the nationality of the victim, or any other connection to the State exercising 
such jurisdiction‟, see Princeton Principles on Universal Jurisdiction 2001. 
50
 Admittedly, Article 42(3) UNCAC in conjunction with Article 44(11) UNCAC contains an obligation to either 
extradite or prosecute (aut dedere aut judicare). However, the scope of this obligation is considerably limited to 
cases where extradition is denied solely on the ground that the person in question is a national of the requested 
State Party. Furthermore, this rule presupposes an extradition request. Thus, the application of this jurisdiction is 
heavily qualified. Therefore, Bacio Terracino‟s assertion that UNCAC „creates a treaty based quasi-universal 
jurisdiction over corruption‟ is ambiguous, Bacio Terracino (2012) 178. The Joint Separate Opinion of Judges 
Higgins, Kooijmans and Buergenthal in ICJ Arrest Warrant of 11 April 2000 (Democratic Republic of the Congo 
v Belgium) (Judgment) ICJ Rep 2002 20 et seq. 68 para 41 points out the difference to pure universality. 
51
 Iqbinedion (2009) 65 goes as far as to claim that the jurisdictional provision „wittingly or unwittingly 
legitimises offenders‟ impunity.‟ 
52
 Bacio Terracino (2012) 195.  
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3.4.1   UNCAC 
UNCAC addresses in Article 30(2) only the issue of immunity at the national level deriving 
from national law
53
 which thwart criminal trials against national public officials before 
domestic courts. This follows from the wording „immunities […] accorded to its [the State 
Party‟s] public officials‟ (emphasis added). Unfortunately, UNCAC follows a rather soft 
approach on this essential jurisdictional impediment: Article 30(2) UNCAC requires merely 
an appropriate balance between any immunities on the one hand and the possibility of 
effective law enforcement on the other hand and thus leaves States Parties considerable 
discretion.
54
 This provision is weakened further by the reservation in favour of domestic law, 
especially constitutional principles.
55
 
3.4.2   General public international law  
UNCAC does not aim at modifying the existing public international law on immunities, as far 
as the crime of corruption is concerned. Public international law provides for both (functional) 
immunity ratione materiae and (personal) immunity ratione personae.
56
 
3.4.2.1  Immunity ratione materiae 
All public agents irrespective of their rank enjoy immunity ratione materiae which is a limited 
immunity only for public acts committed within the context of their official duties, as opposed 
to private acts, since only then can these acts be imputed to the State.
57
 The crucial and highly 
                                                 
53
 For Europe, see the overview on the existing immunity laws and the crime of corruption by Hoppe T „Public 
Corruption: Limiting Criminal Immunity of Legislative, Executive and Judicial Officials in Europe‟ (2011) 5 
Vienna Journal on International Constitutional Law 538 et seq. 
54
 Chaikin D „Policy and Legal Obstacles in Recovering Dictator‟s Plunder‟ (2005) 17 Bond Law Review 31; 
Low (2006) 13 speaks of „almost unfettered discretion‟. On the implementation up to now, see Implementation 
Review Group CAC/COSP/IRG/2013/7.  
55
 Article 30(2) UNCAC itself provides for this reservation. Article 30(9) UNCAC reiterates the priority of 
domestic law. Furthermore, It is particularly regrettable that UNCAC does not explicitly require States Parties to 
limit immunity from criminal prosecution for corruption offences to the duration of the public official‟s tenure in 
office, see Carr I „The United Nations Convention on Corruption: Making a Real Difference to the Quality of 
Life of Millions?‟ (2006) 3 Manchester Journal of International Economic Law 36. 
56
 Cassese A International Criminal Law 2 ed (2008) 303 et seq.  
57
 After all, exactly this imputation justifies the need for functional immunity, since State sovereignty and inter-
State relations are only at stake where there is an act of a State. A criminal trial over a conduct which can be 
imputed to a State leads – at least indirectly – to a judgment on the conduct by a foreign State; Marsch AC 
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controversial question is therefore whether corruption offences are to be qualified as public 
acts which are imputable to the State or rather a conduct committed in a personal capacity. In 
this regard, there is – due to very little and inconsistent State practice – no settled legal clarity 
as to the status quo of customary international law.
58
 The traditional, conservative 
understanding of public international law emphasises both the interests in protecting State 
sovereignty and the value of functioning inter-State relations for the international community 
and would thus answer the question on immunity for corruption offences in the affirmative. 
However, a more progressive approach would ultimately prioritise an effective fight against 
corruption over the aforementioned legitimate interests and thus deny immunity.
59
 Since the 
jurisprudence of the International Court of Justice (ICJ) seems to follow a rather conservative 
understanding of immunities in general,
60
 it can be assumed that in the potential case in which 
State A brings a suit against another State B before the ICJ on the grounds of a criminal 
prosecution of a public official of State A before a national criminal court in State B,
61
 the 
Court is likely to maintain an immunity-friendly attitude and to find a violation of the rights 
of State A under international law. 
                                                                                                                                                        
Strukturen der internationalen Korruptionsbekämpfung. Wie wirksam sind internationale Abkommen? (2010) 
239 et seq. 
58
 Likewise, existing national jurisprudence on this matter is inconsistent and a clear line is not discernible, see 
Chaikin (2005) 31 et seq.; Marsch (2010) 240 with further references.  
59
 Cautiously in this direction, Commonwealth Secretariat, Report of the Commonwealth Working Group on 
Asset Repatriation para 22: „The Commonwealth, as a group of 53 States, could through its recommendations 
and actions perhaps encourage a movement in international law so that in future the exception to functional 
immunity might well be applicable to corruption offences.‟ 
60
 See, for instance, ICJ Arrest Warrant of 11 April 2000 (Democratic Republic of the Congo v Belgium) 
(Judgment) ICJ Rep 2002 3. As regards immunities of the State itself as opposed to immunities of its officials, 
more recently ICJ Jurisdictional Immunities of the State (Germany v. Italy: Greece intervening) (Judgment) ICJ 
Rep 2012 143 para 106 „[i]mmunity cannot . . . be made dependent on a balancing exercise‟. 
61
 In September 2012, Equatorial Guinea indeed filed a case against France at the ICJ because of an alleged 
violation of immunity, after France had issued a warrant of arrest for Teodorin Obiang, Equatorial Guinea‟s 
President‟s son. Shortly after Teodorin Obiang became subject of the proceedings in France, he was appointed 
second vice President. As far as can be seen, France has not consented in the proceeding pursuant to Article 
38(5) of the Rules of the Court, without which the Court cannot exercise its jurisdiction, see ICJ Press Release 
No 2012/26, http://www.icj-cij.org/presscom/files/6/17096.pdf. (accessed 26 October 2013), Willsher K „France 
issues arrest warrant for son of Equatorial Guinea president‟ The Guardian 13 July 2012 available at 
http://www.theguardian.com/world/2012/jul/13/france-arrest-warrant-equatorial-guinea (accessed 26 October 
2013).  
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3.4.2.2  Immunity ratione personae 
Immunity ratione personae, which covers any conduct, thus unambiguously including 
corruption offences, is temporally limited to the official‟s tenure in office. It also only applies 
to „certain holders of high-ranking office in a State, such as the Head of State, the Head of 
Government and Ministers of Foreign Affairs‟62. Thus, these serving high-level officials can 
clearly not be criminally prosecuted before foreign national courts for corruption charges 
while in office.
63
 After leaving office, they enjoy immunity ratione materiae for official acts, 
like any ordinary public official.
64
  
3.1.1  Concluding remarks on immunities 
In conclusion, UNCAC does not address adequately the – admittedly complex – issue of 
immunities.
65
 By making a reservation in favour of domestic law and thus creating a 
considerable loophole for States Parties, UNCAC fails to ensure that immunities are limited 
to the minimum amount necessary for the performance of the public official‟s functions.  
3.5   Asset recovery provisions 
The return of assets is, according to Article 51 UNCAC, a „fundamental principle‟ and a 
primary objective of the convention.
66
 UNCAC goes beyond comprehending asset recovery 
as a tool which is complementary to criminal prosecution, in the aftermath and on the basis of 
a criminal conviction. UNCAC provides for non-conviction based asset recovery
67
 as an 
alternative to criminal prosecution in situations where the latter is for whatever reason not 
                                                 
62
 ICJ Arrest Warrant of 11 April 2000 ICJ Rep 2002 20 et seq. 
63
 See Article 2 of the self-evidently non-binding resolution on Immunities from Jurisdiction and Execution of 
Heads of State and of Government in International Law adopted by the Institut de Droit International in 2001; 
Marsch (2010) 238.  
64
 For former Heads of State, the resolution by the Institut de Droit International rejects immunity, see Article 
13(2) sentence 2: „Nevertheless, he or she may be prosecuted and tried when the acts alleged constitute a crime 
under international law, or when they are performed exclusively to satisfy a personal interest, or when they 
constitute a misappropriation of the State‟s assets and resources.‟ 
65
 For a concurring view, Low (2006) 13.  
66
 COSP UNCAC Resolution 1/4 (2006) considerations para 1. According to the travaux préparatoires, the 
expression „fundamental principle‟ has no legal consequences on the other more specific provisions of Chapter 
V, A/58/422/Add.1 para 48. 
67
 Article 54(1)(c) UNCAC. On non-conviction based asset forfeiture, see Greenberg TS et al. Stolen Asset 
Recovery: A Good Practices Guide for Non-conviction Based Asset Forfeiture (2009).  
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feasible.
 68
 In this regard, asset recovery can therefore be understood as the second-best 
solution: If no criminal trial is possible, than at least economical restoration of the status quo 
ante; if criminal impunity, than at least civil accountability.  
3.5.1   Implicit acknowledgment of grand corruption by UNCAC 
Chapter V UNCAC, which deals with asset recovery, is of eminent practical importance 
particularly in instances of grand corruption involving very large amounts of money.
69
 By 
contrast, in instances of petty corruption, proceeds of the crime are most likely to be spent 
immediately by the respective public official, given its rather small amount. Perpetrators of 
grand corruption on the other hand tend to hide their enormous proceeds in foreign 
jurisdictions usually seeking to prevent the detection of and attempting to secure the spoils of 
corrupt acts. Against this background, it is fair to argue that Chapter V UNCAC shows the 
drafters‟ awareness of the phenomenon of grand corruption. By devoting a whole chapter to 
asset recovery, of which use will most likely be made of in practice only in instances of grand 
corruption, UNCAC implicitly addresses grand corruption in its operative part as opposed to 
the reference in the preamble.
70
  
3.5.2   Challenges and obstacles 
Asset recovery, being a relatively recent field of international law, continues to face a myriad 
of legal challenges, originating in particular from the involvement of various jurisdictions.
71
 
                                                 
68
 In the context of grand corruption, national security, namely the danger of a coup d‟état, may be a reason why 
the leaders of the previous regime can de facto not be put on trial in the respective home country. For the 
example of Marcos of the Philippines, see Chaikin D „Controlling Corruption by Heads of Government and 
Political Elites‟ in Larmour P & Wolanin N (eds) Corruption and Anti-Corruption  (2001) 110.  
69
 Vlassis D „The United Nations Convention against Corruption: Overview of its Contents and Future Action‟ 
(2005) 66 Resource Material Series 121. Admittedly, the wording does not provide for a certain threshold of 
value of the assets, see UNCAC Secretariat „Innovative Solutions to Asset Recovery‟ (2007) 5:  „asset recovery 
is not limited to cases of grand corruption.‟ However, given the complexity, length, costs and cumbersomeness 
of asset recovery processes, asset recovery for cases involving small amounts would be highly ineffective and is 
therefore de facto rather unlikely. 
70
 In its preamble, UNCAC refers to the phenomenon of grand corruption, however, without using the term 
„grand corruption‟, see note 37.  
71
 COSP UNCAC Resolution 3/3 (2009) considerations para 3; UNCAC Secretariat „Innovative Solutions to 
Asset Recovery‟ (2007) 3. See also, for the challenges Egypt has faced in requests for mutual legal assistance for 
asset recovery in the aftermath of the demise of Mubarak, Permanent Mission of Egypt to the United Nations 
„Note verbale dated 7 October 2011‟ 4 et seq.  
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In addition, it is important to note that processes of asset recovery do not – despite the legal 
provisions in Chapter V UNCAC – happen in a political vacuum, but typically have 
significant political dimensions and may thus face various political obstacles: First, the 
requested State Party may have doubts about the political legitimacy of the new government 
in the requesting State Party. In particular, no requested States Party will seriously be willing 
to squander futile resources on asset recovery if confiscated assets would eventually be 
returned to a subsequent government which faces pervasive corruption allegations. Secondly, 
and more fundamentally, in order to be started in first place the process of asset recovery 
presupposes, as a matter of principle, the political will of the victim State to request other 
States for cooperation.
72
. Furthermore, a lack of capacity especially in poorer States Parties 
can be a factual obstacle to the recovery of proceeds of corruption in an internationally 
accepted manner.
73
 
3.5.3   Concluding remarks on asset recovery 
Practice has shown that Chapter V UNCAC is a promising anti-corruption tool
74
 tailored 
primarily to instances of grand corruption. It should be noted, however, that the strong 
endorsement by scholarship for this chapter tends to underrate the fundamental assumption of 
                                                 
72
 Current examples of lack of political will to recover assets are the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Haiti, 
Equatorial Guinea, Gabon and Congo Brazzaville; see Daniel T & Maiton J (2013) 316 et seq. Admittedly, 
Article 56 UNCAC provides for the (non-mandatory) possibility of States Parties to take measures without prior 
request. However, this provision is to be understood as an exception and necessitates that the State Party acting 
considers that „the disclosure of such information might assist the receiving State Party in initiating or carrying 
out investigations, prosecutions or judicial proceedings or might lead to a request by that State Party… .‟ Thus, 
in the clear absence of political will in the victim State, this provision is no convincing legal base for adopting 
unilateral measures.  
73
 Technical assistance provisions in Chapter VI UNCAC are designed to address and remedy this obstacle. In 
this regard, the Stolen Asset Recovery (StAR) Initiative, a unique joint World Bank-United Nations Office on 
Drugs and Crime (UNODC) partnership, is worthwhile mentioning, see http://star.worldbank.org/star/ (accessed 
26 October 2013). 
74
 Currently, in the aftermath of the uprisings in the Arab world, often referred to as „Arab spring‟, much effort 
has been and is still being made to repatriate money stashed away above all in bank accounts in Switzerland and 
the UK by the former Heads of States, such as Ben Ali of Tunisia, Hosni Mubarak of Egypt and Gadhafi of 
Libya. The final results still remain to be seen. Allegedly, Switzerland froze assets of Mubarak and 18 of his 
associates only 30 minutes after Mubarak stood down, see El Masry S „A daunting mission: Getting back 
Egypt‟s stolen assets‟ Daily News Egypt 10 April 2013 available at 
http://www.dailynewsegypt.com/2013/04/10/a-daunting-mission-getting-back-egypts-stolen-assets/ (accessed 26 
October 2013). According to TI, the amount of money and assets frozen by financial centres like Switzerland, 
Canada, the US and UK in the aftermath of the Arab Spring totals at least US$50 billion, see 
http://www.transparency.org/news/feature/clamping_down_on_kleptocrats (accessed 26 October 2013). 
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UNCAC that victim States of grand corruption would take action.
75
 Without action on the 
side of the victim State, Chapter V runs the risk of becoming a dead letter.  
3.6    Enforcement and Monitoring 
Regarding enforcement and monitoring of States Parties‟ obligations under UNCAC, the 
convention lacks legal „teeth‟, especially as far as grand corruption is concerned.76 
3.6.1   No binding enforcement mechanism on international level 
In the drafting process, there was no consensus on establishing an international organ with 
jurisdiction over natural persons charged with the crime of corruption.
77
 By the same token, 
UNCAC does not provide for international mechanisms to hold a government accountable in 
case it fails to effectively enforce the obligation to fight corruption and to prosecute grand 
corruption.
78
 Thus, UNCAC lacks binding enforcement measures at the international level.
79
 
3.6.2   Monitoring the implementation of UNCAC 
During the third Conference of States Parties in Doha in 2009, States Parties agreed to fulfil 
the mandate originating in Article 63(7) UNCAC in practice by establishing a Mechanism for 
the Review of Implementation of UNCAC.
80
 The mechanism consists of a review of all States 
Parties by the governmental experts of two other States Parties, resulting in a country report, 
the publication of which remains within the discretion of the reviewed States Party.
81
 A visit 
to the State being reviewed is only possible upon its agreement;
82
 there are no investigatory 
                                                 
75
 Daniel T & Maiton J (2013) 322. 
76
 Proposals to establish a stronger implementation mechanism did not gain sufficient support, Webb (2005) 220 
et seq. 
77
 Article 63 UNCAC establishes the Conference of States Parties (COSC). However, the COSC is no judicial 
organ and lacks the power to create a criminal tribunal, see Carranza R „Plunder and Pain: Should Transnational 
Justice Engage with Corruption and Economic Crimes‟ (2008) 2 The International Journal of Transitional 
Justice 328. 
78
 Article 66(2) UNCAC provides for the competence of the ICJ. However, only obligations owed to other States 
Parties may give rise to a claim before the ICJ. Lack of compliance with the obligation to prevent and combat 
grand corruption within the State itself would not entitle another State Party to request the ICJ to state a violation 
of UNCAC provisions, see Bacio Terracino (2012) 312 et seq. 
79
 Boersma (2012) 98. 
80
 COSP UNCAC Resolution 3/1 (2009). 
81
 COSP UNCAC Resolution 3/1 (2009); Terms of reference for the Mechanism for the Review of 
Implementation of UNCAC paras 18, 33, 37 et seq.  
82
 Terms of reference for the Mechanism for the Review of Implementation of UNCAC para 29. 
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powers allocated to the reviewing States Parties. Thus, States Parties who fail to properly 
implement and consistently enforce UNCAC have nothing to fear. The existing mechanism 
indeed largely fails to ensure that States Parties implement UNCAC. The effectiveness of the 
review mechanism will, in the absence of any compulsory measure, largely depend on the 
voluntary cooperativeness of States Parties.
83
  
3.6.3   Concluding remarks on enforcement and monitoring 
For want of effective international enforcement and monitoring instruments, enforcement of 
the provisions of UNCAC largely remains a domestic issue. The degree of compliance with 
the existing duties under UNCAC continues to depend heavily on the political will of the 
State concerned, which is typically absent in cases of grand corruption. This can potentially 
lead to a high degree of selectivity of efforts to combat corruption. Criminal prosecutions for 
the crime of corruption of political opponents of the government or low-ranking officials may 
be used as a fig leaf to detract attention from grand corruption cases.
84
 Ironically, UNCAC 
relies on those high-level officials who commit the crime to enforce the criminalisation of 
corruption.
85
 This fact makes it likely that perpetrators of grand corruption can, by virtue of 
their positions of power, escape criminal prosecution at the domestic level and enjoy de facto 
immunity.  
3.7    Legal reality: effectiveness of the international legal framework 
Since corruption is typically a consensual crime, characterised by secrecy and collusion
86
, 
mostly without an apparent or direct victim,
87
 much corruption goes unreported and will 
                                                 
83
 As Prof. Mark Pieth put it eloquently, UNCAC‟s soft monitoring system is a „platform for corrupt elites‟ 
which „allows everybody to feel good and to look good‟; lecture at UWC, Cape Town, South Africa on 
17 October 2013. 
84
 Mbaku JM Corruption in Africa: Causes, Consequences and Cleanups (2007) 145; Daniel T & Maiton J 
(2013) 304 with reference to Nigeria. 
85 
Even more ironically, some of these high-level public officials even sat at the negotiating table and were able 
to influence the (limited) scope of mandatory obligations under UNCAC, see U4 (2011) 22. 
86
 It goes without saying that this is only true of two-sided forms of corruption, such as bribery. Once the corrupt 
deal is fulfilled, neither the briber nor the bribee has an interest in denouncing the corrupt act, since both are 
guilty of the crime of corruption.  
 
 
 
 
21 
never be revealed. Therefore it is extremely difficult, if not impossible, to quantify the 
magnitude of corruption
88
 in any meaningful way and also to measure empirically success or 
failure of the existing legal framework in addressing grand corruption. To merely focus on the 
number of investigations and ultimately criminal convictions
89
 as an indicator for success or 
failure would neglect to sufficiently take into account the deterrent effect of criminalisation. 
In the absence of empirical evidence, a reliable assessment of how effective the existing legal 
framework is in combating grand corruption can in fact not be made. However, for recent 
efforts relating to asset recovery for proceeds originating from grand corruption,
90
 numerous 
media reports and publications by NGOs indicate that grand corruption is still today being 
committed with (criminal) impunity
91
; the number of hitherto undetected cases remains a 
matter of speculation. 
                                                                                                                                                        
87 
At any rate, as a rule, immediately identifiable victims are not present at the scene of the crime and the costs to 
individual members of society are hard to measure. This does not mean, however, that corruption is a victimless 
crime, see Vlassis D „The United Nations convention against corruption: a successful example of international 
action against economic crime‟ (2012) 15 Temida 62. Carr I „Corruption (2007) 244 identifies „humanity‟ as 
victim of corruption.  
88
 On the challenge how to measure corruption, see Sampford C et al. (ed) Measuring Corruption (2006).  
89
 For the the recent examples of criminal convictions for corruption charges against the former heads of State, 
see Burt JM „Guilty as Charged: The Trial of Former Peruvian President Alberto Fujimori for Human Rights 
Violations‟ (2009) 3 The International Journal of Transitional Justice 384 et seq. (Fujimori of Peru), Kortam H 
„Mubarak trial postponed‟ Daily News Egypt 14 September 2013 available at 
http://www.dailynewsegypt.com/2013/09/14/mubarak-trial-postponed-2/ (accessed 26 October 2013) (Mubarak 
of Egypt), Adetunji J „Ben Ali sentenced to 35 years in jail‟ 20 June 2011‟ The Guardian 20 June 2011 available 
at http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2011/jun/20/ben-ali-sentenced-35-years-jail (accessed 26 October 2013) 
(Ben Ali of Tunisia). Indeed, about the half of all criminal indictments of heads of States between 1990 and 2008 
were based on charges of financial crimes, namely corruption; Lutz EL & Reiger C „Introduction‟ in Lutz EL & 
Reiger C (ed) Prosecuting Heads of State (2009) 12 et seq. In Latin America, there have been more corruption-
related investigations than investigations for human rights crimes, Roht-Arriaza N in Lutz EL & Reiger C (ed) 
Prosecuting Heads of State (2009) 61. 
90
 See the overview of international action to freeze assets belonging to former heads of State, their entourage 
and certain State entities under their control in FATF, Report Laundering the Proceeds of Corruption (2011) 51 
et seq. 
91
 See, for instance, Mohammed U „Corruption in Nigeria: A Challenge to sustainable Development in the 
Fourth Republic‟(2013) 9 European Scientific Journal 118 (Nigeria); See also Open Society Justice Initiative  
Corruption and Its Consequences in Equatorial Guinea, A Briefing Paper, 2010 available at 
http://www.opensocietyfoundations.org/publications/corruption-and-its-consequences-equatorial-guinea 
(accessed 26 October 2013) (Equatorial Guinea); See U4 „Chasing kleptocrats‟ loot: Narrowing the effectiveness 
gap‟ (2012) 21: „Kleptocracy remains common, and impunity for those engaged in such crimes is still the norm‟. 
See also the grand corruption case inventory of 2011 in FATF Report Laundering the Proceeds of Corruption 
(2011) 47 et seq. 
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3.8    Concluding remarks on the existing international legal framework for grand  
 corruption 
UNCAC's remarkable accomplishment was to put corruption on the global agenda in an 
unprecedented way and to create awareness of the evils of corruption. However, the analysis 
has shown that UNCAC is in several respects insufficient and thus fails to deliver an 
adequate framework for bringing perpetrators of grand corruption to justice.
92
 The crux of the 
matter is that UNCAC assumes that States will take action in instances of grand corruption. 
This assumption is often as close to reality as to expect a burglar to surrender to the police by 
himself and to return the stolen goods.
93
 In reality, the police must investigate upon receiving 
notice by the victim, i.e. the owner or lawful possessor of the burgled good. In instances of 
grand corruption, however, political leaders may very well be in the position to impede any 
investigations, especially if the domestic judiciary is prone to corruption itself and lacks 
independence. Whilst the burgled citizen can call the police for help, the victim nation of 
grand corruption may not have an independent and effective institution to address. Given the 
existing law on jurisdiction and immunities, prosecutions of grand corruption by States other 
than the victim State, i.e. for instance by the home State of a foreign company involved in a 
corruption scheme or the State in which money is stashed away in bank accounts, are unlikely 
to be an alternative to domestic prosecutions. Furthermore, there is no international institution 
that could step in and bring justice to victims. 
In conclusion, if national systems fail, UNCAC may fail to deliver surrogate remedies and 
leaves open an accountability gap. Ten years after the adoption of UNCAC, it is time to 
contemplate pursuing new progressive paths in order to ensure effective enforcement of the 
                                                 
92
It shall not be disregarded that the scope of UNCAC is obviously limited by the need to reach international 
consensus. It is rather unlikely that a better negotiation result could have been obtained back in 2003; U4 (2011) 
23.  
93 
This comparison was adopted by Daniel T & Maiton J (2013) 322.   
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UNCAC provisions and to facilitate actual accountability of those high-level officials who 
evade justice by virtue of their power over national criminal justice systems.  
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CHAPTER 4: THE ICC AND GRAND CORRUPTION DE 
LEGE LATA 
De lege lata, there is no express individual criminal responsibility for the crime of corruption 
under international law. Hitherto, the crime of corruption does not merit specific mention in 
any statute in force
94
 of an international criminal court or tribunal. This chapter examines 
whether, despite the absence of specific mention in the Rome Statute, the ICC can de lege lata 
exercise jurisdiction over some forms of corruption. 
4.1    Conceptualising grand corruption as one of the existing core crimes 
4.1.1   Grand corruption as a crime against humanity 
Several scholars
95
 and representatives of civil society
96
 have argued that a case could be made 
for grand corruption to fulfil the prerequisites of crimes against humanity, namely the act of 
„extermination‟97 or, more importantly, the category of „[o]ther inhumane acts of a similar 
character intentionally causing great suffering, or serious injury to body or to mental or 
physical health.‟98 Mostly, corruption scenarios in developing countries are referred to, in 
order to support the argument. As much as high-level officials squander millions or even 
                                                 
94
 However, see Article 28A(1)(8), Article 28I AU Draft Protocol on Amendments to the Protocol on the Statute 
of the African Court of Justice and Human Rights, 15 May 2012. 
95 
Bantekas (2006) 466 et seq.; Starr (2007) 1257 et seq.; Acquaah-Gaisie GA „Curbing Financial Crime among 
Third World Elites‟ (2005) 8 Journal of Money Laundering Control 379; Harms BC „Holding Public Officials 
Accountable in the International Realm: A New Multi-Layered Strategy to Combat Corruption‟ (2000) 33 
Cornell International Law Journal 202.  
96
 The Nigerian NGO Socio-Economic Rights and Accountability Project (SERAP) formally petitioned the 
Office of the Prosecutor of the ICC in April 2008 to „examine and investigate whether the systemic/grand 
corruption in Nigeria amounts to a crime against humanity within the jurisdiction of the International Criminal 
Court ... .‟, see http://serap-nigeria.org/seraps-paper-the-international-anti-corruption-conference-bangkok-
thailand/ (accessed 26 October 2013) para 49. SERAP filed another petition in April 2012, this time limited to a 
specific fuel subsidy scheme, see http://serap-nigeria.org/6bn-fuel-subsidy-loot-international-criminal-court-
asked-to-punish-indicted-officials/ (accessed 26 October 2013). As far as can be seen, neither the OtP nor 
SERAP have made comments on the outcome of these petitions, which is why it must be assumed that both 
petitions are part of the 26 Article 15 communications in relation to the situation in Nigeria, which had been, 
according to the OtP, manifestly outside the jurisdiction of the Court; see http://www.icc-
cpi.int/en_menus/icc/structure%20of%20the%20court/office%20of%20the%20prosecutor/comm%20and%20ref/
pe-ongoing/nigeria/Pages/nigeria.aspx (accessed 26 October 2013). In this regard, see also the Facebook group 
„Corruption Is A Crime Against Humanity‟ https://www.facebook.com/CorruptionIsACrimeAgainstHumanity 
(accessed 26 October 2013). 
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 Article 7(1)(b) Rome Statute. 
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 Article 7(1)(k) Rome Statute. 
 
 
 
 
25 
billions of US$, the argument runs, corrupt acts can result in citizens being pauperised, 
starved and even subjected to physical harm. Thus, it can be argued that grand corruption 
leads to extreme poverty and extreme poverty kills.
99
 
The significant merit of this approach is that it is based on recourse to the current provisions 
of the Rome Statute without necessitating cumbersome and politically difficult amendment 
procedures. The potential legal shortcomings and pitfalls have been widely discussed 
elsewhere, which is why the paper confines itself to depicting the selected crucial aspects 
without thorough examinations of all elements of the crime.
100
 
As regards the act of „extermination‟, grand corruption may in a given case fulfil the 
requirement of „intentional infliction of conditions of life, inter alia the deprivation of access 
to food and medicine‟, according to Article 7(2)(b) Rome Statute. It is theoretically 
conceivable that extreme instances of grand corruption, in particular embezzlement of goods 
essential for survival such as food or medicines, indeed lead to the deprivation of basic needs 
of citizens and may ultimately cause deaths. However, given the multi-causal reasons of 
(lethal) poverty, it will hardly ever be possible to provide evidence of causality between a 
specific corrupt act and deaths of citizens.  
The variant of „[o]ther inhumane acts‟, for which an act causing, even mediately101, „great 
suffering or serious injury to body or to mental or physical health‟102 and „similar to any other 
act referred to in article 7‟103 is sufficient, appears much more promising. Certain acts of 
grand corruption can potentially meet the standard of the aforementioned actus reus.
104
 
However, the greatest legal hurdle and linchpin of the case appears to be the requisite mens 
                                                 
99
 Starr (2007) 1284. 
100
 For an exhaustive analysis, see Boersma (2012) 320  et seq. 
101
 Starr (2007) 1301 et seq. with reference to Kittichaisaree K International Criminal Law (2001) 127. 
102
 Article 7(1)(h) Rome Statute.  
103
 See Elements of Crimes for Article 7(1)(k) of the Rome Statute.  
104
 It is to be noted that crimes against humanity, especially acts of apartheid, imprisonment and persecution, do 
not necessarily presuppose physical violence. 
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rea contained in the default provision Article 30 Rome Statute
105
, the interpretation of which 
has been controversial in scholarship
106
 as well as within the ICC
107
. In the ICC‟s first trial 
judgment of 2012, a restrictive interpretation prevailed such that the wording „will occur‟ in 
Article 30(2)(b) Rome Statute as opposed to „may occur‟ excludes the concept of dolus 
eventualis; Article 30 Rome Statute is limited to first and second degree of dolus directus.
108
 
Applying these yardsticks, in most grand corruption cases the requisite dolus directus is not 
present, or in any event, cannot be proven.
109
 Usually, perpetrators of grand corruption will 
not intend, but only acquiesce to inflict, the „great suffering or serious injury to body or to 
mental or physical health‟ as a mere ancillary effect of her or his corrupt conduct.110 Rather, 
they intend to enrich themselves or associated third persons. Hence, at least as a general rule, 
mens rea in the form of dolus directus with regards to inflicting „great suffering or serious 
injury‟ is not met. 
In conclusion, based on the majority view of the hitherto existing Trial Chamber 
jurisprudence as to the mens rea requirements
111
, neither Article 7(1)(b) nor Article 7(1)(k) 
                                                 
105
 This obstacle arises as well as regards the act of „extermination‟. 
106
 Elewa Badar M „The Mental Element In The Rome Statute Of The International Criminal Court: A 
Commentary From A Comparative Criminal Law Perspective‟ (2008) 19 Criminal Law Forum 473 et seq.; 
Werle G & Jessberger F „“Unless Otherwise Provided”: Article 30 of the ICC Statute and the Mental Element of 
Crimes under International Criminal Law‟ (2005) 3 Journal of International Criminal Justice 52 with further 
references; Werle (2009) para 409 et seq. 
107
 ICC The Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, Decision on the Confirmation of Charges, Pre-Trial Chamber 
I 29 January 2007 (hereafter ICC Lubanga Decision on the Confirmation of Charges) para 349 et seq. including 
dolus eventualis in Article 30 Rome Statute; then deviating and excluding dolus eventualis ICC The Prosecutor 
v. Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo, Decision on the Confirmation of Charges, Pre-Trial Chamber II 15 June 2009 
para 360 which was confirmed by ICC The Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, Judgment Pursuant to 
Article 74 of the Statute, Trial Chamber 14 March 2012 (hereafter ICC Lubanga Judgment) para 1011  
108
 ICC Lubanga Judgment para 1011. As far as can be seen, this interpretation has not yet been either validated 
or dismissed by the ICC Appeals Chamber; the most recent transcript of the Appeals Chamber in this matter 
dates back to October 2010, see http://www.icc-cpi.int/en_menus/icc/situations%20and%20cases/situations/ 
situation%20icc%200104/related%20cases/icc%200104%200106/transcripts/appeals%20chamber/Pages/Index
.aspx (accessed 26 October 2013). Critically, however, ICC The Prosecutor v. Mathieu Ngudjolo Chui, 
Judgment Pursuant to Article 74 of the Statute, Trial Chamber II 18 December 2012, concurring opinion of 
Judge Christine Van den Wyngaert para 38: „reliance on „risk‟ as an element under Article 30 of the Statute is 
tantamount to accepting dolus eventualis dressed up as dolus directus second degree.‟; Ohlin JD „Bombshell 
Acquittal at the ICC‟ available at http://www.liebercode.org/2012/12/bombshell-acquittal-at-icc.html (accessed 
26 October 2013); Liefländer TR „The Lubanga Judgment of the ICC: More than just the First Step?‟(2012) 1 
Cambridge Journal of International and Comparative Law 204 et seq. 
109
 At least, this is so, unless the ICC decides to modify its interpretation of Article 30 Rome Statute. 
110
 Boersma (2012) 337. 
111
 ICC Lubanga Judgment para 1011.  
 
 
 
 
27 
Rome Statute is an adequate and sound legal base for prosecuting most cases of grand 
corruption. Under lex lata, conceptualising and prosecuting corruption as a crime against 
humanity can in most cases not withstand legal scrutiny. 
4.1.2   Grand corruption as a war crime  
Several war crimes, as listed in Article 8 Rome Statute, such as the appropriation or seizure of 
specific property
112
 or impeding relief supplies
113
, have an economic dimension. It is thus 
theoretically conceivable that, if committed on a grand scale, these war crimes may in a given 
case simultaneously be tantamount to grand corruption. However, this option of the ICC to 
address grand corruption is very limited in its scope: grand corruption must be committed in 
the context of an (international or non-international) armed conflict
114
 and the targeted objects 
are strictly limited
115
; in particular, property belonging to persons on the perpetrator‟s own 
side is no protected object.
116
 Therefore, grand corruption as a war crime remains a very 
special and rare case; most instances of grand corruption will not be covered. 
4.2    Other options for the ICC to address grand corruption 
Historical cases, arguably most prominently Augusto Pinochet,
117
 as well as present trials 
before the ICC provide evidence that grand corruption and the commission of core crimes 
frequently go hand in hand. Dictatorial regimes tend to be both „brutal and corrupt‟.118 To 
name but a few, Al Bashir, current President of Sudan
119
, Gbagbo, former President of Côte 
                                                 
112
 Article 8(2)(a)(iv), Article 8 (2)(b)(xiii), Article 8(2)(e)(xii) Rome Statute. 
113
 Article 8(2)(b)(xxv) Rome Statute. 
114
 On the nexus between the individual act and the armed conflict, see Werle (2009) para 1001 et seq.  
115
 Werle (2009) para 1149 et seq.  
116
 Werle (2009) para 1152. 
117
 US, Senate Executive Report 109-25, 109
th
 Congress 1
st
 Session (2005) available at 
http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CPRT-109SPRT20278/html/CPRT-109SPRT20278.htm (accessed 
26 October 2013); Kofele-Kale N „Change or the Illusion of Change: The War Against Official Corruption in 
Africa‟ (2006) 38 George Washington International Law Review 723 et seq.; STAR „Augusto Pinochet‟ 
available at http://star.worldbank.org/corruption-cases/node/18468 (accessed 26 October 2013). Another 
prominent example is Fujimori of Peru, see note 94.  
118
 Carranza R (2008) 310. This is, by way of example, also true for the South-African apartheid regime, see van 
Vuuren H Apartheid grand corruption: Assessing the scale of crimes of profit from 1976 to 1994 (2006).  
119
 According to WikiLeaks information, Al Bashir embezzled allegedly US$ 9 billion, see Simons M 
„Prosecutor Confirms Accusation Against Sudan Leader‟ New York Times 1 January 2011 available at 
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d'Ivoire
 120
, and Muammar Gaddafi, the late ruler of Libya
121
, face, or have faced corruption 
allegations, in addition to the criminal charges for crimes within the jurisdiction of the ICC. 
Frequently, high-level public officials abuse their political power not only to commit core 
crimes but at the same time to enrich themselves by committing grand corruption. The 
proceeds of grand corruption can also be essential for facilitating the commission of core 
crimes.
122
 Without financial backing, many core crimes could not be committed.
123
 The ICC 
can address this interrelation in the following two ways: prosecuting grand corruption as 
assistance to the commission of core crimes and elucidating the financial background of core 
crimes during the criminal trial. These options will be discussed in turn. 
4.2.1   Grand corruption as assistance in the commission of core crimes 
To the extent that proceeds of grand corruption are used to finance the commission of core 
crimes, prosecution for assistance in the commission of the crime
124
 is one option for the ICC 
to deal with corruption, under lex lata. Yet, this option may turn out to be of little practical 
relevance for two reasons: First, given the limitation of perpetrators of grand corruption to 
high-level officials, in many instances, the one who has the power to commit grand corruption 
may also commit the core crime as a perpetrator under Article 25(3)(a) Rome Statute, 
irrespective of his or her financial contribution to the commission of the crime. The higher 
                                                                                                                                                        
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/01/02/world/africa/02wikisudan.html?pagewanted=all&_r=1& (accessed 
26 October 2013).  
120
 Willsher K „Ousted president Laurent Gbagbo charged in Ivory Coast‟ The Guardian 19 August 2011 
available at http://www.theguardian.com/world/2011/aug/19/ivory-coast-charges-laurent-gbagbo (accessed 
26 October 2013); STAR „Lauren Gbagbo‟ available at http://star.worldbank.org/corruption-cases/node/18537 
(accessed 26 October 2013).  
121
 Peachey P „Leaked cables reveal Gaddafi's iron grip on corrupt regime‟ The Independent 24 February 2011 
available at http://www.independent.co.uk/voices/commentators/paul-peachey-leaked-cables-reveal-gaddafis-
iron-grip-on-corrupt-regime-2223980.html (accessed 26 October 2013).  
122
 For instance, the Sierra Leone Truth and Reconciliation Commission revealed that corruption and bad 
governance were the prime causes of the armed conflict in the context of which a vast number of core crimes had 
been committed. Schabas W „A Synergetic Relationship: The Sierra Leone Truth And Reconciliation 
Commission And the Special Court for Sierra Leone‟ (2004) 15 Criminal Law Forum 11. See on the relation 
between corruption and the occurrence and duration of armed conflict, Le Billon P „Buying Peace or Fuelling 
War: The Role of Corruption in Armed Conflicts‟ (2003) 15 Journal of International Development 413 et seq. 
123 
On the other hand, the availability of resources originating from grand corruption can have the effect of 
maintaining impunity from prosecution for the commission of core crimes before national courts, unless the ICC 
steps in and exercises its jurisdiction, see Carranza (2008) 312. 
124
 Article 25(3)(c) Rome Statute explicitly states that providing the means for the commission of a crime is one 
form of assistance.  
 
 
 
 
29 
level of individual responsibility for the commission of the core crime as a perpetrator would 
then render the responsibility for aiding and abetting legally moot
125
. Secondly, if the grand 
corrupter‟s role is indeed limited to aiding and abetting the commission of the core crime, he 
or she may not necessarily be someone who „bears the greatest responsibility‟. This would be 
necessary, however, for being prosecuted before the ICC, according to the Office of the 
Prosecutor‟s policy of focused investigations and prosecutions.126 
4.2.2   Addressing the financial background of existing core crimes 
Arguably most importantly, the ICC can address the phenomenon of grand corruption to the 
extent that it examines the background circumstances of the commission of the crimes subject 
to the trial, and reveals how the commission of core crimes had been financed.
127
 Ultimately, 
the financial background of alleged crimes may be mentioned in the judgment as part of the 
factual overview.
128
 
4.3    Concluding remarks on de lege lata options 
As argued above, criminal prosecutions for grand corruption based on the charge of crimes 
against humanity, are, as a rule, not feasible. Except for a few war crimes provisions which 
may cover some rare instances of grand corruption, the ICC has, under lex lata, no 
jurisdiction over the crime of corruption. Relying on the current language of the Statute, the 
ICC lacks legal powers to close the accountability gap left open by UNCAC. Yet, after all, the 
ICC can indeed shed light on corrupt practices insofar as they finance and enable the 
                                                 
125
 It is still unsettled how to deal with a multiplicity of forms of criminal responsibility. Yet, it does not appear 
legally convincing to convict a perpetrator of the crime for the commission as well as for assistance to his or her 
own crime. 
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 OtP, Prosecutorial Strategy 2009-2012 (2010) para 19. 
127
 Indeed, the OtP emphasises the importance of financial information as evidence to prove the role of those 
most responsible and to assist in reparations to victims; OtP, Prosecutorial Strategy 2009-2012 (2010) para 34. 
Tejan-Cole A „Don‟t bank on prosecuting grand corruption as an international crime‟ available at 
http://www.osisa.org/sites/default/files/dont_bank_on_prosecuting_grand_corruption_as_an_international_crim
e_-_abdul_tejan-cole.pdf (accessed 26 October 2013) calls for the ICC to „take seriously the investigation of the 
financial aspects of alleged atrocities.‟ 
128
 This could be more or less comparable to how the Trial Chamber I investigated and ultimately described the 
political, social and historical background of the conflict in Ituri and the Hema-Lendu conflict in its ICC 
Lubanga Judgment para 70 et seq. 
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commission of core crimes and can thereby raise awareness for the harmfulness of corruption. 
With that being said, a discussion on whether the ICC can and should de lege ferenda have 
jurisdiction over grand corruption is warranted.  
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CHAPTER 5: THE ICC AND GRAND CORRUPTION DE 
LEGE FERENDA 
This chapter will firstly argue that it is conceivable to confer the ICC jurisdiction over grand 
corruption as so-called treaty crime, even in the absence of consensus to elevate grand 
corruption to a crime under international law. The core of this chapter is a discussion of 
potential advantages of and objections to such an amendment to the Rome Statute.  
5.1    Feasibility: The Rome Statute’s openness to new crimes 
The establishment of the ICC can be traced back to an initiative of 1989 by Trinidad and 
Tobago which requested the UN General Assembly „to address the question of establishing an 
international criminal court … with jurisdiction over persons … engaged in illicit trafficking 
in narcotic drugs across national frontiers … .‟ 129  Subsequently, the negotiation process 
shifted gradually
130
 but fundamentally in another direction. In Rome, the negotiators opted 
notoriously – for various reasons131 – for limiting the jurisdiction of the ICC to „the most 
serious crimes of concern to the international community as a whole‟, in other words the well-
known four core crimes. Thus, ultimately, Trinidad and Tobago failed with its endeavour to 
include drug trafficking
132
 which is a transnational or treaty crime, just as the crime of 
corruption under lex lata, to the jurisdiction of the ICC.
133
 It should be noted, however, that 
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 UN Doc. A/RES/44/39 (1989). 
130
 On the development, Sunga LS The Emerging System of International Criminal Law: Developments in 
Codification and Implementation (1997) 206 et seq. Still in Rome, State delegates called for the inclusion of 
treaty crimes, see, for instance, the remark by the Libyan delegate, United Nations Diplomatic Conference of 
Plenipotentiaries on the Establishment of an International Criminal Court, Rome 15 June -17 July 1998, Volume 
II para 82.  
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 Especially, the newly established institution shall not be too ambitious and break new ground, as far as the 
jurisdiction ratione materiae is concerned, but rather rely on crimes under international law universally 
recognised by customary international law. For the sake of attaining universal support, the jurisdiction should be 
rather limited, see Report of the Commission to the General Assembly on the Work of its Forty-Eighth Session, 
(1996) Yearbook of the International Law Commission Vol. II 16 et seq. 
132
 Interestingly, Trinidad and Tobago also failed with its proposal to include including „state theft‟ as a crime 
against humanity; Marsch (2010) 228. 
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 By the same token, proposals to confer jurisdiction over the crime of terrorism to the ICC failed to gain 
sufficient support.  
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the Rome Conference nevertheless acknowledged these proposals by adopting Resolution E 
as part of its Final Act which  
„[r]ecommends that a Review Conference pursuant to Article 123 of the Statute of the 
International Criminal Court consider … drug crimes with a view to arriving at an 
acceptable definition and their inclusion in the list of crimes within the jurisdiction of 
the Court.‟134  
The amendment proposal was reaffirmed once more prior to the first Review Conference in 
2010
135
, but failed to gain support, inter alia, against the background that resources were 
focused on defining the crime of aggression
136
. Despite this the proposals remain on the 
agenda of the Working Group on Amendments
137
. In conclusion, the Rome Statute‟s drafting 
history and subsequent amendment controversies show that the inclusion of so-called treaty 
crimes, which are not penalised under customary international law, into the Rome Statute has 
been a serious consideration, albeit a controversial
138
 one which has hitherto been 
unsuccessful. Therefore, the inclusion of the crime of corruption – as it had indeed been 
envisaged by the Commonwealth
139
 – is at least theoretically feasible, regardless of whether 
corruption can be conceptualised as a crime under international law. If this is indeed the case, 
the proposal to include grand corruption within the jurisdiction of the ICC would face far less 
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 UN Doc. A/CONF.183/10 (1998). 
135
 Trinidad and Tobago – supported by Belize – proposed a significant limitation to acts „pos[ing] a threat to the 
peace, order and security of a State or region‟, see Article 5 (2) of the proposed amendment; ICC-
ASP/8/43/Add.1 (2009) Annex VI.  
136
 ICC-ASP/10/32 (2011) para 5.  
137
 The Working Group on Amendments was established by the 8
th
 Assembly of States Parties, ICC-
ASP/8/Res.6. Trinidad and Tobago continues to fight for the inclusion of drug crimes, see Rambachan S, 
Minister of Foreign Affairs of Trinidad and Tobago, Statement at the Opening Ceremony of the Caricom 
Regional Seminar, 16 May 2011 available at 
http://www.foreign.gov.tt/site_media/media/attachments/2011/05/18/Statement_-_ICC_Openinng_Ceremony.pdf 
(accessed 26 October 2013).   
138
 The pros and cons of inclusion of treaty crimes have been discussed extensively elsewhere, Boister N „The 
Exclusion of Treaty Crimes from the Jurisdiction of the Proposed International Criminal Court: Law, 
Pragmatism, Politics‟ (1998) 3 Journal of Armed Conflict Law 27 et seq. An essential argument against their 
inclusion is the assumption that national jurisdictions accompanied by international co-operation are better suited 
to deal with these crimes.  
139
 Commonwealth Secretariat (2005) Recommendation Nr. 9.   
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obstacles
140
 and could more likely attract consensus among States Parties, since the inclusion 
of treaty crimes would considerably modify the nature of the Court and indeed necessitate 
answering many (especially jurisdictional) open questions
141
. However, there is, from a 
legislative point of view, no compelling reason to force a specific criminal conduct to fit into 
the existing core crimes for being subject to amendment. 
5.2    Legitimacy of international prosecution by the ICC 
Apart from the question of theoretical feasibility, it must be clarified whether international 
prosecutions of the crime of corruption by the ICC are indeed legitimate. 
5.2.1  Criteria of the Rome Statute  
As has been argued, States Parties are free to confer jurisdiction over treaty crimes to the ICC, 
if they have the political will to do so. Reasons of expediency or practical need would, in 
principle, suffice to legitimise an amendment of the Rome Statute.
142
 And yet, an even 
stronger case in favour of an amendment can be made if it can be argued that instances of 
grand corruption can indeed fulfil the criteria that existing core crimes have in common. 
According to the current Rome Statute the mandate of the ICC is limited to „the most serious 
crimes of concern to the international community as a whole‟143 which „threaten the peace, 
                                                 
140
 For instance, it appears debatable whether at all and if so under which conditions certain treaty crimes can 
amount to one of „the most serious crimes of concern to the international community as a whole‟ (Article 5 
Rome Statute, Preamble (4) Rome Statute). The potential lack of double-criminality may necessitate a 
modification of various provisions of the statute; Report on the Working Group on Amendments, ICC-
ASP/10/32 para 22. See further, Broomhall B International Justice and the International Criminal Court: 
Between State Sovereignty and the Rule of Law (2003) 38 et seq. on a potentially necessary amendment to 
Article 22 Rome Statute.  
141
 For instance: Is the inclusion possible as substantive provision or is there need for an additional international 
treaty which provides for the criminalisation of the crime of corruption? Or is the international consensus on 
criminalising corruption in UNCAC sufficient? Is this only the case for UNCAC States Parties? Is a referral by 
the Security Council or by a non-State Party possible? See, on the underlying ambiguity of the substantive or 
jurisdictional nature of the R provisions defining crimes in the Rome Statute, Milanović M „Is the Rome Statute 
Binding on Individuals? (And Why We Should Care)‟ (2011) 9 Journal of International Criminal Justice 25 et 
seq. 
142
 Such amendment would amount to using the ICC as an international enforcement mechanism for national 
prohibitions without creating a new crime entailing individual responsibility directly under international law; 
Broomhall B International Justice and the International Criminal Court: Between State Sovereignty and the 
Rule of Law (2003) 37. 
143
 Preamble (4), Article 5 Rome Statute. 
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security and well-being of the world‟ 144  (emphasis added). These notions, as Broomhall 
argues, „elude easy and perhaps any definition‟ 145  which makes an argument in either 
direction per se contestable.
146
 
5.2.2  Application of the criteria 
The assertion that grand corruption can be a concern to the international community as a 
whole, may appear bold at first glance, given that the immediate and direct repercussions 
usually are a financial loss for the public budget of the victim State only. Digging deeper and 
taking into account the mediate and indirect consequences of grand corruption, it becomes 
apparent that the case can indeed be made that corruption can affect the international 
community as a whole.
147
 
Grand corruption is often blamed for a myriad of evils in the world, such as, inter alia, 
political instability
148
, armed conflict
149
, terrorism
150
 and poverty
151
. Further, corruption is 
deemed to undermine legitimacy and efficiency of governing institutions, to jeopardise the 
rule of law and to be a major obstacle to achieving development goals
152
. Even though studies 
have indeed indicated a correlation between corruption and all these phenomena, precise 
causalities remain relatively untested.
153
 However, in the author‟s opinion, both political and 
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 Preamble (3) Rome Statute. 
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 Broomhall (2003) 44. 
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 Ultimately, it is up to States to determine whether these criteria are fulfilled; Broomhall (2003) 39. 
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 See, for instance, Hartelius J & Borgenhammar E „Corruption as a threat to international security and conflict 
resolution: A systems approach to preventing and stopping corruption‟ (2011). 
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 Mauro P „Corruption and Growth‟ (1995) 110 Quarterly Journal of Economics 705. 
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 Le Billon (2003) 413 et seq.  
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 Thachuk K „Corruption and International Security‟ (2005) 25 The SAIS Review 143 et seq. 
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 Eigen, Chair of TI: „Corruption is a major cause of poverty as well as a barrier to overcoming it‟, see 
http://www.transparency.org/research/cpi/cpi_2005 (accessed 26 October 2013). 
152
 The World Bank has identified corruption as the „single greatest obstacle to economic and social 
development‟, see 
http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/TOPICS/EXTPOVERTY/EXTEMPOWERMENT/0,,content
MDK:20312308~isCURL:Y~menuPK:543262~pagePK:148956~piPK:216618~theSitePK:486411,00.html 
(accessed 26 October 2013).  
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 Often, corruption is rather a symptom than the cause. Needless to say that correlation does not prove 
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economic consequences
154
 of grand corruption can be used to argue in favour of the 
legitimacy of international criminal prosecutions. 
5.2.2.1  Political consequences: enabling commission of core crimes 
Instances of grand corruption can lead to political instability
155
 within a State which may in 
turn be the pre-condition for armed conflict
156
 and the commission of existing core crimes. It 
is generally recognised that countries which are affected by grand corruption are likely to 
experience political and/or ethnic conflict, which is often even violent.
157
 Furthermore, many 
armed conflicts, especially in Africa, have shown evidence that corruption prolongs ongoing 
conflicts.
158
  
On the other hand, history has shown that grand corruption can be crucial for sustaining 
authoritarian regimes which are responsible for serious human rights violations amounting to 
crimes against humanity.
159
 The survival of an authoritarian regime, the argument runs, 
depends on the commission of grand corruption by its political leaders. Fighting grand 
corruption thus could be said to equate to shortening the lifespan of authoritarian regimes 
inclined to commit core crimes to defend and sustain their power. 
Given the merely mediate link to the harrowing consequences of existing core crimes, 
international criminal prosecution of grand corruption means „to get down to the root of the 
trouble‟. By fighting grand corruption, the ICC would tackle a phenomenon which enables 
and furthers the commission of core crimes. Hence, international criminal prosecutions of the 
                                                 
154
 These consequences are undoubtedly interrelated. 
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 Atuobi SM „Corruption and State Instability in West Africa: An Examination of Policy Options‟ (2007) 
available at http://www.readbag.com/reliefweb-sites-reliefweb-int-files-resources-
9bd8a1f729ceb5b8c125746c0049d740-kaiptc-dec2007 (accessed 26 October 2013): „The United Nations Office 
for West Africa (UNOWA) considers „actual or even perceived massive corruption‟ as one of the factors that 
increases „the vulnerability of States to coup d‟état and render a coup almost unavoidable‟. From a positivistic 
point of view, this threat is expressed in preamble (3) UNCAC.  
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 Le Billon (2003) 424 concludes convincingly that „[c]orruption is … not in itself a sufficient or even 
necessary factor in the outbreak of armed conflicts.‟ 
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 UN Doc. A/CONF.203/6 (2005) para 26 et seq. 
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 See, for instance, the conflict in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, S/2001/357 (2001). 
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 For example the Peruvian Fujimori regime, Burt (2009) 387. 
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crime of grand corruption are ultimately aimed at preventing genocide, crimes against 
humanity and war crimes. 
Thus, a fairly strong case can be made that by contributing to the commission of „the most 
serious crimes of concern to the international community as a whole‟ grand corruption itself 
threatens – admittedly only indirectly, but sufficiently – the peace, security and well-being of 
the world itself, which legitimises international prosecution by the ICC. 
5.2.2.2  Economic consequences: rampant poverty 
Economically, if committed on a very large scale involving millions or even billions of US$, 
instances of grand corruption, can, if committed in capital-poor countries, potentially destroy 
whole national economies with the foreseeable result of rampant poverty. Particularly 
illustrative is the topical case of the oil- and gas-rich west African State Equatorial Guinea, 
where the President and his son allegedly embezzled hundreds of millions of US$
160
, while 
the population continued to live in desperate poverty
161
. 
Grand corruption misallocates public funds away from public services that are desperately 
needed by the poor in order to assure basic health care and education and towards either 
projects prone to corruption or directly towards the private fortune of high-level public 
officials. Resources which could have been invested in the most basic, sometimes even life-
saving services, are instead accumulated and stashed away in foreign bank accounts for the 
private use of the perpetrators of grand corruption. Thus, in poor States, corruption can 
mediately lead the deaths of many. 
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 In the US alone, the revised complaint indicates that the President‟s son spent US$ 315 million on real estate 
and luxury goods between 2004 and 2011, see United States District Court for the Central District of California , 
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Consequences in Equatorial Guinea 3; UN Human Development Index Rank (2013): 136 out of 187 countries, 
http://hdrstats.undp.org/en/countries/profiles/GNQ.html (accessed 26 October 2013). 
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These economic consequences of grand corruption, the argument runs, are outrageous 
injustices which deserves the condemnation of the so-called international community, just as 
in the case of the existing core crimes
162
, regardless of whether the political consequences of 
grand corruption facilitate the commission of existing core crimes. 
5.2.3  Concluding remarks on legitimacy of international prosecution by the ICC 
In conclusion, it is not compelling, but nor is it unreasonable, to argue that, despite the 
absence of proof of clear causalities, normatively a case can be made that the aforementioned 
political and economic consequences can turn grand corruption into one of the „most serious 
crimes of concern to the international community as a whole‟. This in turn legitimises 
particularly international criminal prosecutions of grand corruption.
163
 
5.3    Advantages of internationalisation of criminal prosecution 
Immediate access to law enforcement agencies capable of effectively executing arrest 
warrants and practical expediency, e.g. better availability of witnesses, better access to 
evidence and easier participation of victims, make national courts in the State where the crime 
had been committed generally the most convenient and most obvious place for the conduct of 
criminal trials.
164
 However, national criminal justice systems may suffer various shortcomings 
and deficiencies which may, at least to some extent, be remedied by the following advantages 
of international criminal prosecutions. 
                                                 
162
 As Ocheje PD „Refocusing International Law on the Quest for Accountability in Africa: The Case Against 
the “Other” Impunity‟ (2002) 15 Leiden Journal of International Law puts it: „The magnitude of theft by African 
leaders and the living conditions of most Africans would undoubtedly shock the collective conscience of the 
world.‟ Acquaah-Gaisie (2005) 379: „Large-scale corruption causes the death of infants, devastation by diseases 
such as AIDS and malaria, denial of a decent education – results as serious as the repercussions of armed 
conflict.‟  
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 Whether grand corruption will be one day a crime under international law entailing direct individual criminal 
responsibility and subject to universal jurisdiction, is, in the absence of a treaty, a matter of State practice and 
opinio iuris, see Cassese A International Law 2 ed (2005) 157.  
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 Supreme Court of Israel Attorney-General of the Government of Israel v. Eichmann, 29 May 1962, (1986) 36 
International Law Report 302. Besides that one may argue that national prosecutions can contribute to re-
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5.3.1  Legal argument: no de jure immunity 
In the existing international anti-corruption law, as has been elaborated above, high-level 
public officials enjoy in most instances de jure immunity both from the jurisdiction of their 
own national courts provided by domestic law and from the jurisdiction of a third State 
arising from international law
165
 By contrast, Article 27(2) Rome Statute affirms that 
immunity regardless of whether deriving from domestic or international law is no obstacle to 
prosecution before the ICC. It is indeed one of the essential achievements of international 
criminal law, first applied in practice in the post-World War II Nuremberg
166
 and Tokyo
167
 
trials, to overcome the obstacle of immunities deriving from official capacity which can be 
used by the most powerful actors within a State to escape justice before domestic courts.
168
 
Thus, internationalisation of criminal prosecution appears particularly warranted, where the 
national prosecutors‟ hands are tied due to de jure immunity for high-level officials.169  
5.3.2  Political argument: less politicisation  
Politically powerful public officials working in the highest echelons of a State may exercise 
their influence on the prosecutor to impede an indictment or alternatively on the judge 
adjudicating the case to hand down a decision of acquittal or to impose a far too lenient 
sentence which does not reflect the seriousness of the crime. Furthermore, frequently, grand 
corruption is committed in a political environment in which also the judiciary is highly prone 
to corruption. A corrupt national judiciary lacking genuine independence of political 
interference most likely renders the national fight against grand corruption impossible and can 
result in de facto immunity.
170
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 See above 3.4. 
166
 Article 7 Charter of the International Military Tribunal (Nuremberg Charter). 
167
 Article 6 Charter of of the International Military Tribunal for the Far East (Tokyo Charter).  
168
 However, this achievement is being challenged by the recent resolution of the African Union; AU Press 
Release No 177/2013 available at http://www.au.int/en/sites/default/files/PR-
%20177Extarordinary%20Summit%20on%20ICC-%2011-10-13-F.pdf (accessed 26 October 2013).  
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 This is a further argument in favour of the limitation to high-level officials, see above 2.2.4. 
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 See Starr (2007) 1291. 
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By contrast, a politically influenced Prosecutor and biased or corruptible judges at the ICC are 
by far less likely, since they normally have „no … political axe to grind‟171 in the particular 
State concerned. Vulnerability to political pressure and political manipulation of the actors at 
the ICC cannot be ruled out entirely
172
, but appears to be an unrealistic scenario.
 
A lesser 
degree of politicisation of criminal trials before the ICC may enable a more fair and 
independent proceeding as well as lead to better credibility of the judgment and is therefore 
an important advantage of international criminal prosecutions.
173
 
5.3.3  Moral argument: deterrence effect  
The purpose of prosecuting grand corruption before the ICC is not so much retribution as 
moral stigmatisation of corruption, as is true for international criminal prosecutions in 
general.
174
 A criminal trial before the ICC implies a strong moral condemnation and universal 
disapproval of acts of grand corruption and creates a powerful message that the so-called 
international community does not tolerate corruption with tremendous repercussions. Grand 
corruption can no longer be dismissed as a peccadillo; impunity for grand corruption is no 
longer accepted.
175
 
The basic assumption and hope is that this special stigma has a strong deterrent effect not 
only on individual (potential) perpetrators who may thus take the possibility of criminal 
prosecution by the ICC into account in their cost-benefit analysis. In addition to that, this 
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 Cassese A „Reflections on International Criminal Justice‟ (1998) 61 The Modern Law Review 7.  
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 Organs of international criminal justice do not act in a political vacuum either; the President of the Court 
Judge Song put it as follows: „The Court is a judicial institution operating in a highly political environment.‟, see 
Moreno-Ocampo L, ICC Prosecutor, Keynote Address, Council on Foreign Relations, 4 February 2010 6 
available at http://www.cfr.org/courts-and-tribunals/prepared-remarks-luis-moreno-ocampo-prosecutor-
icc/p21375 (accessed 26 October 2013).  
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 The argument of less politicization may to a lesser extent also be applied to highly politicised domestic 
corruption trials after an overthrow of a regime in a transitional phase. These trials are often accused of not 
taking fair trial rights particularly seriously, but serving a political agenda, namely to fulfil the purpose of 
legitimizing the new regime and even to try to divert the public by shortcomings of the new regime, as recent 
trials against former heads of States in the aftermath of the „Arab Spring‟ evidence. 
174
 Cassese A „International Criminal Justice Mechanisms: are they really so needed in the present world 
community?‟ lecture at London School of Economics, 13 November 2000 15 available at 
www.lse.ac.uk/humanRights/articlesAndTranscripts/Casseselse.doc (accessed 26 October 2013). 
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 ICTY The Prosecutor v. Kupreškić et al., Judgment of 14 January 2000, Trial Chamber para 848: „[A]nother 
relevant sentencing purpose is to show the people of not only the former Yugoslavia, but of the world in general, 
that there is no impunity for these types of crimes… .‟ (emphasis added). 
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special stigma may also make foreign companies, as potential bribers, and international 
banks, as potential hiding places for the proceedings of corruption, which may both be 
concerned about their reputations, and thus more cautious with whom and under what 
conditions they do business. The resulting preventive impact should not be underestimated, 
since without the involvement of foreign companies and banks most instances of grand 
corruption could not be committed. Even if the ICC fails to enforce its warrant of arrest and 
the accused cannot be captured, the mere indictment can potentially already prevent the 
accused from committing further acts of grand corruption, since aforementioned international 
economic actors will be very keen to not be associated with the political leader indicted by the 
prosecutor of the ICC. This in turn dries up potential sources of bribes and limits 
tremendously the options of hiding places for the proceeds.
176
 In this regard, the ICC could 
interfere with ongoing grand corruption cases and effectively stop further wrong. 
In conclusion, the special stigma associated with international criminal prosecutions has the 
potential to make a decisive contribution to the fight against grand corruption. 
5.3.4  Practical argument: cooperation with States Parties  
Lastly, a practical argument in favour of internationalisation of criminal prosecutions can be 
advanced: International criminal courts, and more particularly the ICC, are better equipped to 
investigate crimes which are not limited to the territory of one State, but cross various State 
borders, as a consequence of which witnesses are based in different countries and gathering 
of evidence necessarily requires cooperation by various States.
 177
 To the extent that the 
concerned States are States Parties to the Rome Statute, they are under the obligation to 
„cooperate fully with the Court in its investigation and prosecution of crimes‟178 which is why 
the prosecutor of the ICC can arguably investigate cross-border crimes more easily than his or 
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 Starr (2007) 1288.  
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 Cassese (2008) 439 makes this point in favour of international criminal justice in general. 
178
 See the general rule in Article 86 Rome Statute; the specific situations are set out in the following articles in 
Part 9 of the Statute.  
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her domestic counterparts, which all too often face various obstacles and little 
cooperativeness when requesting mutual legal assistance.
179
 
In fact, most instances of grand corruption have such a transnational character: either the 
origin of the money can give grand corruption an international dimension, in particular if the 
briber is, as is often the case, a foreign multi-national company; or alternatively the hiding 
place of the proceeds of grand corruption, which are often transferred into private accounts 
located in foreign jurisdictions, renders the crime a cross-border crime.  
5.3.5  Concluding remarks on advantages of internationalisation of criminal 
prosecutions 
As a matter of course, internationalisation of criminal prosecutions is no panacea for the fight 
against impunity for any crime. Yet, it has been argued that internationalisation of criminal 
prosecution of grand corruption can indeed remedy several legal and political deficiencies 
intrinsic to national systems of criminal justice. In particular, where the concentration of 
power in certain persons within a State is the greatest, the more likely– due to de jure or de 
facto immunity – is the failure of the national systems of criminal justice to (effectively) do 
justice, and the more warranted and necessary are international criminal prosecutions. This 
shows that the limitation of a potential crime of corruption to high-level officials is pertinent 
and sound. In addition, moral and practical arguments speak in favour of internationalisation 
of criminal prosecutions of grand corruption. 
5.4    Legal framework of the ICC: appropriate for fight against corruption? 
The general advantages of internationalisation of criminal prosecutions aside, the specific 
legal framework of the ICC is to be analysed as to its appropriateness for fighting grand 
                                                 
179
 However, it must be noted that the ICC Prosecutor ultimately also depends on the willingness of States 
Parties to comply with their obligations to cooperate, as the current situation in Kenya evidence. The Prosecutor 
has no legal powers to force cooperation. The Court may refer the matter for further action to the Assemble of 
States Parties, see ICC „Understanding the International Criminal Court‟ available at http://www.icc-
cpi.int/iccdocs/PIDS/publications/UICCEng.pdf (accessed 26 October 2013). 
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corruption. Two aspects will be discussed in turn: the jurisdictional ambit of the ICC and the 
ICC‟s capacity to bring adequate justice to victims. 
5.4.1  Appropriate Jurisdiction: only in the absence of national efforts 
The principle of complementarity,
180
 according to which international jurisdiction does not 
replace, but simply supplements national jurisdiction, is a particularly adequate response to 
the major shortcoming of existing anti-corruption law, namely the assumption that States 
would necessarily take action in instances of grand corruption. Only in situations in which 
this basic assumption proves to be erroneous and the State concerned fails – for want of either 
ability or willingness – to investigate and prosecute instances of grand corruption, would a 
case be admissible before the ICC. In the absence of political will in the victim State to hold 
perpetrators of grand corruption accountable, the ICC Prosecutor may initiate a proceeding 
propio motu.
181
 Thus, it is fair to argue that the jurisdictional provisions of the ICC are 
particularly apt to close the „accountability gap‟, which only appears if the national system 
fails. In addition, it can be hoped that the complementarity principle will de facto incentivise 
States to create effective domestic remedies for grand corruption cases in order to avoid the 
surrender of their own nationals to the ICC. 
5.4.2  Appropriate financial provisions and remedy for victims 
Furthermore, there are several provisions in the Rome Statute, which are particularly suited to 
fighting grand corruption and delivering justice to victims of economic crimes.  
As soon as a warrant of arrest or summons has been issued, the Pre-Trial Chamber can 
request States take „protective measures‟, such as the identification, tracing and freezing or 
seizure of proceeds, property and assets and instrumentalities of crimes, for the purpose of 
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 Article 17 Rome Statute.  
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 As long as grand corruption is not recognised as a crime under international law, it will be hard to argue that 
impunity for grand corruption entitles the Security Council under Chapter VII UN Charter to refer a situation to 
the ICC, pursuant to Article 13(b) Rome Statute.  
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forfeiture, in particular for the ultimate benefit of victims.
182
 Thereafter, the Rome Statute is 
not limited to imprisonment as applicable penalty, but encompasses fines
183
 and „forfeiture of 
proceeds, property and assets derived directly or indirectly from [the] crime [the defendant 
got convicted for]‟ as conceivable penalties184. Once the defendant is tried and convicted, the 
Court can order the transfer of assets collected through fines or forfeiture into the Trust Fund 
for Victims
185
 which may then implement awards of reparations.
186
 
Albeit drafted for the existing core crimes, all these provisions can be of utter importance and 
are arguably even more appropriate in proceedings based on charges of grand corruption. For 
victims of the crime of grand corruption pecuniary compensation is a particularly adequate 
remedy, since the economic nature of the remedy corresponds with the nature of the crime, 
whereas victims of the existing core crimes may conceive money as inappropriate „blood 
money‟ and even as insulting.187 Compared to the existing core crimes, in the case of grand 
corruption, pecuniary compensation has the potential to undo to a much greater extent the 
harm caused. The return of assets looted by corrupt officials to the country of origin may 
make a considerable contribution to the welfare of its citizens and thus may even have a more 
noticeable and a more concrete impact on citizens of the victim State than the criminal verdict 
itself. Moreover, in cases of grand corruption which involve per definitionem considerable 
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 Article 57(3)(e) in conjunction with Article 93(1)(k) Rome Statute. For example, in the issuance of an arrest 
warrant for Thomas Lubanga, these provisions were made use of, ICC The Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga 
Dyilo, Warrant of Arrest, Pre-Trial Chamber I 10 February 2006 para 141. The Pre-Trial Chamber has identified 
in para 36 the reparation scheme provided for in the Rome Statute as „one of the Statute‟s unique feature‟ and as 
„key feature‟. In the case of Gaddafi, Italy seized assets valued at US$ 1.5 billion upon request by the ICC, see 
AFP „Harley Davidson among seized Gaddafi assets: Italy seizes family assets valued at $1.5bn, including stakes 
in Juventus and UniCredit, following request from ICC.‟ Al Jazeera 29 March 2012 available at 
http://www.aljazeera.com/news/europe/2012/03/201232916563443501.html (accessed 26 October 2013).  
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 Article 77(2)(a) Rome Statute. Pursuant to Rule 146 (1) of the Rules of Procedure and Evidence, the Court 
shall give due consideration to the financial capacity of the convicted person. 
184
 Article 77(2)(b) Rome Statute. 
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 The establishment of the Trust Fund for Victims is based on Article 79 (1) Rome Statute and COSP UNCAC 
Resolution 6 (2012); see http://www.trustfundforvictims.org/ (accessed 26 October 2013).  
186
 Article 79(2) Rome Statute; see also Rule 98 of the Rules of Procedure and Evidence. Alternatively, the Court 
can, pursuant to Article 75(2) Rome Statute, theoretically also issue an order against the convicted person to pay 
appropriate reparations directly to victims. However, in cases of grand corruption, victims can, if at all, not be 
identified without further ado.  
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 Starr (2007) 1295 et seq. 
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amounts of money, it is much more likely that these provisions are in fact relevant in practice 
and money is indeed distributed to the victims. 
The ICC‟s legal powers to freeze and forfeit assets can remedy many of the shortcomings in 
the current system of inter-State asset recovery procedures identified above
188
: effective asset 
recovery will in cases of grand corruption no longer depend on the presence of political will 
in the victim State; asset recovery will arguably no longer founder on a lack of human, 
technical, and material capacity. In addition, States hosting assets deriving from grand 
corruption will most likely be more willing to cooperate with the ICC than with the 
government of the victim State, since a transfer to the Trust Fund for Victims would not face 
the abovementioned political obstacles.
189
 These advantages are particularly relevant in 
instances where the victim nation is still governed by a corrupt regime, since in these 
instances successful asset recovery and ultimately legitimate use of the assets recovered are 
highly unlikely. 
In conclusion, the ICC is particularly vested with legal powers to overcome several 
shortcomings of UNCAC, as far as asset recovery is concerned, and to deliver a meaningful 
remedy to victims of grand corruption. 
5.5    Trivialisation of the ICC or coherent expansion of international criminal law? 
One may argue that the incorporation of the crime of grand corruption in the Rome Statute 
harbours the risk of trivialising the ICC and of reducing the ICC‟s standing and reputation190, 
since the crime of grand corruption may appear far less blameworthy than the existing core 
crimes which usually involve the direct spilling of blood, whereas corruption is occasionally – 
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 See above 3.5.2. 
189
 See above 3.5.2. However, if assets are located in the victim State itself which is unwilling or unable to fight 
grand corruption, the ICC can do very little, as the situation of Kenya evidences, in which Kenya failed to 
comply with the request to identify and freeze assets of the four Kenyans suspects, pursuant to Article 93(1)(k) 
Rome Statute; see the legally untenable stance adopted by Kenya‟s Attorney General Githu Muigai, 
http://www.capitalfm.co.ke/news/2013/01/freezing-of-assets-for-icc-suspects-premature-muigai/ (accessed 
26 October 2013).  
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 This concern was raised by some participants at the Rome Conference with regards to the inclusion of drug 
crimes, Schloenhardt A „Transnational Organised Crime and the International Criminal Court: Developments 
and Debates‟ (2005) 24 University of Queensland Law Journal 117. 
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unjustly
191
 – even referred to as „victimless‟ crime. It would be correct to argue that 
traditionally international criminal law has hitherto focused on situations of organised 
violence and on violations of political and civil rights
192
, which in turn explains the 
widespread reluctance to put grand corruption on an equal footing with genocide, crimes 
against humanity, war crimes and crimes of aggression. 
However, the following aspects indicate that the inclusion of grand corruption would not 
necessarily lead to a systematic inconsistency within the Rome Statute. Firstly, existing 
international criminal law does, even if rarely, encompass conduct which is not necessarily 
violent, such as, for instance, apartheid or persecution
193
, both sub-categories of crimes 
against humanity. Hence, the absence of physical violence is not completely foreign to 
international criminal law and is thus no compelling systematic argument against the 
inclusion of grand corruption. 
Secondly, the historic origins of international criminal law lie in State-sponsored crimes; and 
still today, State involvement is the rule.
194
. Grand corruption – as defined within this research 
paper and thus limited to the public sector – indeed requires per definitionem the involvement 
of public officials working in the highest echelons of a State. The abuse of State power is 
pivotal for the commission of both the majority of existing core crimes and the crime of grand 
corruption. In the case of the latter, abuse of public power is integral to the working definition 
within this paper. Hence, it is fair to argue, from a point of view of criminal phenomenology, 
that the State-sponsored character of grand corruption renders the inclusion of the crime into 
the Rome Statute coherent. 
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 Vlassis (2012) 62.  
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 According to Werle (2009) para 375, the connection to such context of organised violence is what makes an 
ordinary crime a crime under international law. Starr (2007) 1258 calls this a „crisis focus‟.  
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 At least this is so under customary international law, whereas the Rome Statute requires a connection with 
any other act listed in Article 7(1) Rome Statute; Werle (2009) 898. 
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Organization?‟ (2012) 10 Journal of International Criminal Justice 1161. 
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Lastly, the current Rome Statute focuses admittedly on violations of political and civil rights, 
whereas discrete economic crimes resulting in poverty and causing the violation of social and 
economic rights are not (yet) covered by the Rome Statute. In this regard, the inclusion of 
grand corruption appears indeed alien to the present system of the ICC. Yet, here, too, socio-
economic concerns are not completely foreign to the Rome Statute, since war crimes 
(Article 8 Rome Statute) include various conducts violating social and economic rights, such 
as starvation of civilians, albeit only in the context of armed conflict.
195
 Furthermore, critics 
increasingly challenge the existing privilege of civil and political rights over social and 
economic rights and demand that international criminal law should progressively address 
socio-economic abuses as well.
 196
 An expansion of the jurisdiction to the economic crime of 
grand corruption could be a first step in this direction and would reflect a modern holistic
197
 
understanding of protection of human rights which acknowledges the strong interdependence 
of both generations
198
 of human rights. 
In conclusion, commentators may very well be reluctant to accept the reasoning of this paper, 
due to the concern that including economic crimes, in principle, would water down the Rome 
Statute. However, a fairly strong argument can be made that the ICC‟s jurisdiction over the 
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 Van den Herik L Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights - International Criminal Law's Blind Spot? (2013) 9 
et seq. available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2274653 (accessed 26 October 2013); 
Schmid E „War Crimes Related to Violations of Economic, Social and Cultural Rights‟ (2011) 71 Heidelberg 
Journal of International Law 523 et seq. 
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 For instance, Skogly SI „Crimes Against Humanity – Revisited: Is There a Role for Economic and Social 
Rights?‟ (2001) 5 The International Journal of Human Rights 58 et seq. argues that „focusing on civil and 
political rights only is an arbitrary distinction for the victims of atrocities‟. Also the discourse of transitional 
justice is increasingly in flux: Only recently, transitional justice started to address accountability for economic 
crimes generally and corruption more particularly; see, for instance, Carranza R (2008) 310 et seq., Laplante LJ 
„Transitional Justice and Peace Building: Diagnosing and Addressing the Socioeconomic Roots of Violence 
through a Human Rights Framework‟ (2008) 2 The International Journal of Transitional Justice 331. In 
practice, the recently published report by the Truth, Justice and Reconciliation Commission in Kenya reflects 
this tendency, Report Volume IIB 343 et seq. available at 
http://www.tjrckenya.org/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=573&Itemid=238 (accessed 
26 October 2013). 
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 See UNHCR „Key concepts on ESCRs - Are economic, social and cultural rights fundamentally different 
from civil and political rights?‟ available at http://www.ohchr.org/EN/Issues/ESCR/Pages/ 
AreESCRfundamentallydifferentfromcivilandpoliticalrights.aspx. (accessed 26 October 2013). 
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 Political and civil rights are often referred to as „first generation‟ rights as opposed to „second generation‟ 
social, economic and cultural rights, see Vasak K „Human Rights: A Thirty-Year Struggle: the Sustained Efforts 
to give Force of law to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights‟ (1977) 30 UNESCO Courier 29.  
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crime of grand corruption would – in spite of its arguably lesser degree of blameworthiness – 
be a coherent expansion of international criminal law. 
5.6  Overload of the ICC due to limited resources  
Limited resources and capacities
199
 of the ICC militate, prima facie, blatantly against any 
expansion of its jurisdiction.
200
. In this respect, it should be noted, first of all, that limited 
resources of the ICC require a limitation of a potential jurisdiction over grand corruption to 
the most serious cases.
201
 Secondly, in purely arithmetical terms, prosecuting grand 
corruption cases involving billions of US$ can potentially be economically advantageous for 
the victim nation, if there is a reasonable chance to repatriate large part of the assets. 
Thirdly, the inclusion of grand corruption to the Court‟s jurisdiction can be understood as a 
strong political signal which may even have a deterrent impact and further the fight against 
corruption, without a single case brought to trial before the ICC. Irrespective of these 
deliberations, limited financial and material means of the ICC remain indeed a valid argument 
against any extension of the mandate of the ICC. 
5.7  Concluding remarks on the ICC and corruption de lege ferenda 
Admittedly, jurisdiction for the ICC over the crime of corruption is, as a matter of course, no 
„miracle cure‟ in the fight against grand corruption. But the preceding arguments indicate that 
such inclusion can usefully complement the myriad efforts to tackle corruption and has much 
to commend it. Extending the jurisdiction of the ICC to grand corruption would close various 
gaps in the existing international legal framework. It has the potential to deter important 
economic players from doing business with notoriously corrupt leaders and stop corrupt 
activities. Moreover, the ICC would be able to hold powerful leaders responsible for the most 
                                                 
199
 The first eleven years of existence of the ICC have evidenced that its capacity is limited to investigate and to 
prosecute very few cases only. Given that after more than ten years there has still not been a single final 
conviction, the previous practice and performance of the ICC has left many observers rather disappointed. The 
only trial chamber judgment in the Lubanga case is currently still on appeal. 
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 UN Doc. A/AC.249/l para 72: „drug trafficking [is] … „of such a quantity as to flood the court‟. 
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 The Rome Statute indeed already contains a gravity threshold: Article 17(1)(d) and Article 53(1)(b) of the 
Rome Statute all provide the prosecutor with discretionary powers to not investigate cases which are „not of 
sufficient gravity to justify further action by the Court‟. 
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egregious acts of grand corruption when national institutions fail. Lastly, the ICC‟s 
jurisdiction over grand corruption can make a considerable contribution to the repatriation of 
proceeds of corruption which are urgently needed for the victims of grand corruption. 
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CHAPTER 6: GUIDELINES FOR A POTENTIAL CRIME OF 
GRAND CORRUPTION 
The question of how to define the elements of a potential crime of grand corruption remains. 
Further research needs to be done to determine precise contours of a crime of grand 
corruption. This paper does not aim to propose the concrete wording of a potential crime. 
However, the following issues and guidelines can be addressed.  
1. Only a very restrictively and carefully defined crime of grand corruption limited to the 
most egregious acts can, on the one hand, fulfil the requirements of the principle of nullum 
crimen sine lege
202
 and, on the other hand, offer a reasonable prospect of being accepted by 
States Parties and of ultimately being agreed upon.  
2. It is to be decided whether grand corruption is included as a sub-category of crimes against 
humanity
203
 or as a discrete crime. The former variant would ensure a particularly high degree 
of consistency with the existing core crimes, since the chapeau of Article 7 Rome Statute 
would require the presence of the contextual element
204
 „widespread or systematic attack 
directed against any civilian population‟. The latter variant would indeed require further 
research to elaborate a specific and appropriate contextual element for the crime of grand 
corruption and may insofar be better suited to take into consideration the specificities of 
economic crimes. 
3. A clear demarcation between grand corruption as a crime within the jurisdiction of the ICC 
and „ordinary‟ corruption which is to be dealt with by the national criminal justice systems is 
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 See Werle (2009) para 104. 
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 For instance, the then Minister of Justice & Constitutional Affairs of the Republic of Kenya Kiraitu Murungi, 
at the 11th International Anti-Corruption Conference in South Korea, argued that grand corruption should de 
lege ferenda be a crime against humanity, „When Corruption Is A Crime Against Humanity‟ available at 
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(accessed 26 October 2013): „Because corruption has inflicted untold pain and suffering on our people and 
should be condemned by humanity. Indeed, corruption for many of us falls in the same league as rape, torture, 
genocide and other crimes against humanity that rob us of our most essential dignity.‟ 
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essential. The foregoing line of reasoning to legitimise the internationalisation of criminal 
prosecution, namely the effect of promoting the commission of existing core crimes on the 
one hand and the exceptional economic consequences, necessitates a sound limitation of the 
elements of a potential crime to situations where these effects in fact occur or at least threaten 
to occur. It is necessary that such a limitation excludes instances of corruption in which a 
mere distortion of free competition is at stake. This can be achieved through the inclusion of a 
threshold element such as conceivably „causing considerable prejudice to the national public 
budget‟ or „causing a considerable prejudice to the national economy‟.205 Another option is to 
be guided by the proposal by Trinidad and Tobago which intended to limit the ICC‟s 
jurisdiction over drug trafficking to acts „pos[ing] a threat to the peace, order and security of a 
State or region‟ 206 . The challenge for the drafters in this regard will be to satisfy the 
requirements of the principle of legality.
207
 At first glance such threshold element seems to be 
discriminatory, since only cases involving public officials in economically weak and poor 
States will in all likelihood ever meet these criteria, and thus could render the proposed crime 
a crime for „third world leaders‟ only. However, such an element is consistent: the decisive 
factor for the involvement of the ICC should ultimately be the suffering of victims – either as 
victims of the existing core crimes or of rampant poverty caused by grand corruption. Indeed, 
misappropriation of the exact same amount of money may in fact have very different 
repercussions in different economic circumstances: misappropriation of US$ 1 billion in 
Equatorial Guinea may indeed amount to a crime which legitimises internationalisation of 
criminal prosecution, whereas misappropriation of US$ 1 billion out of the State coffers of the 
United States remains an ordinary economic crime which is to be investigated and prosecuted 
by the US national criminal justice system. 
                                                 
205
 Alternatively, drafters may be guided by the Preamble (3) UNCAC which speaks of „vast quantities of assets, 
which may constitute a substantial proportion of the resources of States, and that threaten the political stability 
and sustainable development of those States‟. 
206
 See note 141. 
207
 See Broomhall (2003) 35 et seq.  
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4. It is to be decided which forms of corruption are encompassed. Passive bribery and 
diversion enjoy a mandatory character under UNCAC and are thus arguably the least 
controversial forms of corruption for which a consensus would be most likely and moreover, 
these forms do cover most instances of grand corruption.  
5. While this paper argues in favour of a limitation of potential perpetrators to the powerful 
high-level officials, closer analysis is warranted to determine precisely this circle of potential 
perpetrators. In this regard it must also be clarified, whether persons beyond the circle of 
potential perpetrators, such as persons involved in the laundering of the proceeds of grand 
corruption, can be held liable for secondary participation in the commission of the crime. 
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CHAPTER 7: CONCLUSION  
This paper concludes by giving a short résumé of substantial findings and by providing an 
outlook on the political feasibility of the matter of this paper. It intends to consider how likely 
it is for States to ultimately make the political decision to bestow jurisdiction on the ICC for 
the crime of grand corruption. 
1.1.   Résumé 
Chapter 2 has elaborated the notion of corruption for the purposes of this paper and restricted 
the ambit of the concept to grand corruption in the public sector.  
Thereafter, Chapter 3 has pointed out several significant shortcomings and deficiencies of the 
existing international legal framework for grand corruption. It has been argued that due to 
legal and factual reasons perpetrators of grand corruption may very well escape national 
criminal justice. The chapter has concluded that, if national systems fail to tackle grand 
corruption, UNCAC will fail to deliver surrogate remedies and leaves open an accountability 
gap.  
Chapter 4 has then shown that, under the Rome Statute as of now, the ICC lacks legal powers 
to close the accountability gap left open by UNCAC – except for some very limited special 
cases. Nevertheless the ICC can shed light, the paper suggests, on corrupt practices insofar as 
they are interrelated with the commission of core crimes. 
Chapter 5 has argued that it is conceivable to confer the ICC jurisdiction over treaty-based 
crimes. Irrespective of whether the crime of grand corruption can be conceptualised as a 
crime under international law, it can be subject to amendment. Thereafter, it has been argued 
that international prosecutions of the crime of grand corruption by the ICC can essentially be 
legitimised on the basis of two deliberations: first, the strong nexus to the commission of the 
existing core crimes and secondly, the disastrous economic consequences leading to poverty 
and ultimately causing considerable suffering. The subsequent discussion has evidenced the 
following: 
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(a) The manifold advantages of internationalisation of criminal prosecutions in 
general apply in particular to prosecutions of the crime of grand corruption.  
(b) Also the specific legal framework of the ICC is particularly apt for dealing with 
grand corruption cases. 
(c) The inclusion of grand corruption is not so much a trivialisation of the ICC and 
alien to the existing system as a progressive and coherent amendment. 
By contrast, the risk of overloading the ICC and current challenges the ICC faces may speak 
against a hasty inclusion of the crime. 
Lastly, the previous chapter has shown that many questions as to the elements of a potential 
crime of grand corruption within the jurisdiction of the ICC still remain unanswered and 
warrant further research.  
1.2.   Outlook 
Whether the crime of grand corruption will ever find its way into the Rome Statute is 
completely uncertain. Given that grand corruption has still not reached the same 
condemnation as the existing core crimes – despite deserving it – achieving the necessary 
two-thirds majority at a meeting of the Assembly of States Parties or at a Review 
Conference
208
 and ultimately achieving the ratification by States Parties is, as matters stand 
today, arguably not so much a realistic scenario for the near future as it is political wishful 
thinking. Considering the current harsh criticism from many African States challenging the 
ICC‟s legitimacy, the time may not yet be ripe for the ICC to enter legally uncharted and 
politically controversial territory.  
However, two potential causes for optimism may be identified: First, with reference to the 
crime of aggression, many scholars and representatives of States had considered a consensus 
on the definition of the crime as completely unrealistic and yet the first Review Conference in 
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 Article 121(3) Rome Statute. 
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2010 has proven these pessimists to be wrong in the end. In this context, however, it must be 
remembered that Article 5(2) Rome Statute (old version) contained an express mandate to 
define the crime of aggression and to set out the conditions for exercising jurisdiction over the 
crime, whilst the fundamental decision to grant the ICC jurisdiction over the crime of 
aggression had already been made in Rome in 1998. Therefore, the success story of the 
consensus obtained on the crime of aggression cannot directly be compared with the obstacles 
of the inclusion of an entirely new crime.  
Secondly, the rapid and impressive genesis of international anti-corruption law may offer 
another reason for optimism. When Transparency International was founded 20 years ago as a 
small organisation with the aim to „stop corruption and promote transparency, accountability 
and integrity‟209, bribing foreign officials was in many European countries still tax-deductible 
and thus even „government-sponsored‟. At that time, it must have been completely illusory 
for the founders of Transparency International to predict the uprising of the global anti-
corruption consensus culminating in a legally binding universal convention. It is similarly 
unknown what the international anti-corruption law will look like 20 years from now. Perhaps 
the ICC would have convicted the first perpetrators of grand corruption by then.
210
 However, 
it must be pointed out that the US government was instrumental in placing corruption on the 
international agenda, initially in the 1990s in order to remedy a competitive disadvantage 
resulting from its pioneering role with the adoption of the FCPA. In the last century the US 
government played a crucial role in urging States to sign and ratify UNCAC, this time 
strongly motivated by the desire to combat terrorism
211
, since corruption can indeed 
potentially promote terrorism. For an amendment to the Rome Statute, however, a similar 
                                                 
209
 See http://www.transparency.org/whoweare/organisation/mission_vision_and_values (accessed 26 October 
2013).  
210
 Indeed, in its Strategy 2015, TI goes beyond its aim to raise awareness of the damaging effects of corruption 
and aims at tackling impunity for corruption, see Transparency International „Strategy 2015‟ available at 
http://www.transparency.org/files/content/ourorganisation/TI_Strategy_2015.pdf (accessed 26 October 2013). 
211
 See US Senate Executive Report 109-18 (2006) available at http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CRPT-
109erpt18/html/CRPT-109erpt18.htm (accessed 26 October 2013). 
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stance by the US government which is notoriously critical towards the ICC can arguably not 
be expected. Without such political backing from an influential State, obtaining an 
international consensus will be a much more onerous and protracted task. Thus, both potential 
causes for guarded optimism remain flawed. 
Therefore, it would clearly be overly sanguine to expect an amendment of the Rome Statute at 
the next Review Conference. However, international criminal law is and will most likely 
remain a dynamic and evolving field of law, which had its renaissance only twenty years ago 
and has thus, as it stands at present, come of age only recently. 
In the meanwhile, the ICC can potentially make a considerable contribution to the 
international fight against corruption by shining a light on the nexus of core crimes and 
corruption and thereby creating more awareness for the blameworthiness of the potential 
ramifications of corruption. Corruption is not limited to a distortion of the free market, but 
can indeed be instrumental and pivotal in the commission of „the most serious crimes of 
concern to the international community as a whole‟. The independent judges sitting at the ICC 
can bestow authority and credibility on this message.  
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